Halting the Senseless Civil War Against White-Collar Offenders: “The Conduct Undermined the Integrity of the Markets” and Other Fallacies by Bagaric, Mirko et al.
HALTING THE SENSELESS CIVIL WAR 
AGAINST WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS: “THE
CONDUCT UNDERMINED THE INTEGRITY OF 
THE MARKETS” AND OTHER FALLACIES 
Mirko Bagaric,* Jean Du Plessis** & Jaclyn Silver***
2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1019
ABSTRACT
White-collar offenders understandably attract a significant 
amount of resentment and animosity. They often make large profits 
through cheating the financial system. The antipathy the community 
feels towards these offenders has resulted in increasingly tough
sanctions being meted out to them. In the United States, it is not 
uncommon for white-collar offenders to be sentenced to 
imprisonment for over a decade. This approach is fundamentally 
flawed. It is an illustration of collective community venting 
prevailing over sound evidence-based policy. This Article focuses on 
white-collar offenders who cheat the stock market. We argue that the 
reflexive unabated practice of increasingly harsh penalties for 
offenders who commit insider trading and market manipulation 
offenses has resulted in the community punishing itself by directing 
scarce public resources into the prison industry and away from 
demonstrable social goods in the form of education and health, 
without any corresponding benefit to the community. The two main 
reasons for imposing harsh sentences on market cheats are the 
desire to deter others from committing similar offenses and to 
maintain the integrity of the markets. In this Article, we demonstrate 
that these rationales are flawed. The weight of existing empirical 
data establishes that long prison terms do not deter people from 
committing similar offenses. We also examine the impact of high 
profile market offenses on the value of shares. The Article contains 
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an empirical analysis regarding whether there is a link between 
white-collar offenses and the integrity of the markets (which is an 
assumption made by courts). The study shows that there is no 
demonstrable link between major stock market crime and a lowering 
in the value of the market. The value of the stock market does not 
normally fall in response to high profile financial market offenses. 
This Article argues that the civil war against white-collar offenders 
should stop. The humanistic toll on white-collar offenders (as a 
result of being subjected to disproportionate punishment) and the 
financial burden on the community stemming from the burgeoning 
cost of imprisonment have already produced too much self-inflicted 
harm. Imprisoning fewer white-collar (and other fraud) offenders 
will assist in ameliorating the incarceration crisis in the United 
States while at the same time ensuring that proportionate penalties 
are imposed on such offenders. It will also hopefully provide the 
impetus for more wide-ranging evidence-based reforms to the 
sentencing system, which has resulted in more than two million 
Americans being incarcerated—the highest in history. 
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INTRODUCTION
White-collar and other fraud offenders are regularly sentenced 
to imprisonment, and often for long terms. In fact, the trend is to 
increase the severity of penalties for these offenders.1 There is no 
countermovement to this trend. This is to be expected given that 
there is little, if any, community empathy for offenders who profit by 
cheating the market. 
Yet, sentencing should be a rational social endeavor. It is the 
area of law where the community acts in its most coercive manner 
against private citizens.2 The deliberate infliction of pain against 
citizens must have a demonstrated justification beyond the impulse 
to punish wrongdoers.3 This Article argues that there is no rational 
basis for subjecting white-collar offenders to long prison terms. This 
is especially the case in relation to stock market offenders. 
Sentencing is too important for outcomes to be driven by 
“common sense” and reflexive sentiments regarding what feels right 
or seems correct. Instead the process should be driven by evidence-
based principles, which take into account the objectives that can be 
achieved through state-imposed punishment and normative ideals 
regarding the proper aims and justification of punishment.4
1. See infra Part II. For a brief overview of the recent key reforms towards 
harsher sentencing for white-collar offenses, see Anna Driggers, Raj Rajaratnam’s 
Historic Insider Trading Sentence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 2021 (2012); Mirela V. 
Hristova, The Case for Insider-Trading Criminalization and Sentencing Reform, 13
TRANSACTIONS 267, 267-68 (2012).
2. Andrew E. Taslitz, The Rule of Criminal Law: Why Courts and 
Legislatures Ignore Richard Delgado’s Rotten Social Background, 2 ALA. CIV. RTS.
& CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 79, 81-82 (2011).
3. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION 158 (J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., 1970).
4. Mirko Bagaric et al., A Principled Strategy for Addressing the 
Incarceration Crisis: Redefining Excessive Imprisonment as a Human Rights Abuse,
38 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
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The main consideration that should guide penalty type and 
length is the principle of proportionality, which stipulates that the 
harshness of the punishment should match the seriousness of the 
crime.5 The key reason that white-collar offenses should be dealt 
with less severely than is currently the practice is because empirical 
data establishes that these offenses cause far less harm than violent 
and sexual offenses.6 In short, the harshest criminal sanctions7 should 
generally be reserved for the crimes that cause the most harm. 
White-collar offenses are not in this offense category. This is 
especially so in relation to white-collar offenses that do not cause a 
demonstrable loss to individuals. It is these offenses, in the form of 
insider trading and market manipulation crime, that are the focus of 
this Article.8
While insider trading and market manipulation offenses often 
do not have identifiable victims,9 the harsh sanctions that are 
typically imposed on such offenders are often sought to be justified 
on the basis of two key rationales. These objectives are general 
5. This is the theory that a harsh sanction will discourage the particular 
offender from reoffending. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part IV. 
7. The harshest criminal sanction in the United States is obviously the death 
penalty. However, in assessing the nature of gravity of criminal sanctions we exclude 
the death penalty. The United States is the only developed nation apart from Japan that 
still imposes the death penalty. Death Penalty Statistics Country by Country,
GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/29/ death-penalty-
countries-world#data [https://perma.cc/2QDN-QNLM] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
Because of its extreme nature, the death penalty raises for discussion a number of 
different human rights and normative considerations. Indeed, the literature and analysis 
regarding the desirability of the death penalty is voluminous. It can only be examined 
in the context of a stand-alone dissertation focusing on this issue. This is not a 
meaningful limitation to this paper given that not all states impose the death penalty 
and since 1976 there have been less than 1,421 executions. Facts About the Death 
Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/ 
FactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2AK-T4T7] (last updated Aug. 30, 2016). There are 
thirty-one states that still have the death penalty. Id.
8. We also focus on insider trading and market manipulation offenses 
because these offenses often involve very large sums of money and receive media 
attention. See, e.g., Hristova, supra note 1, at 268-69 (discussing the high-profile 
case of Ivan Boesky). This enables us to test the hypothesis that there is a supposed 
link between such crimes and activity in the market.
9. Although they do not have identifiable victims, we accept that this 
conduct should be a criminal offense. For a counter view, see some of the arguments 
set out in Hristova, supra note 1. The author ultimately accepts that the better view 
is that insider trading should be a crime. 
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deterrence10 and the desire to maintain the integrity of (and investor 
confidence in) the stock market. Both these rationales are flawed. 
The empirical data shows that, contrary to common sense, 
harsh sanctions do not deter crime.11 Further, the link between 
offenses committed involving the stock market and a reduction in 
confidence in the integrity of the market has not been validated. In 
this Article, we test the impact that high profile insider trading and 
market manipulation cases have on the value of the stock market. We 
do this by examining the change in the value of the stock market on 
the day of the relevant sentence, the following day, and a week after 
the sentence. We conclude that there is no evidence of a link between 
serious stock market crime and the value of the stock market. Our 
study shows that in the period shortly after a sentence is handed 
down for a major stock market offense the value of the market more 
commonly increases than decreases at about the same rate as general 
movements in the market. 
An empirically grounded application of sentencing principles 
to white-collar offenses, and in particular to financial market cheats, 
would result in a considerable reduction in the penalties imposed on 
offenders. Prison would be used far more sparingly in relation to 
these offenders and, when it is used, the duration should be 
considerably shorter than is currently the norm. 
If the reform recommendations in this Article are adopted, this 
would result in a reduction in use of imprisonment and increase the 
fairness in the sentencing process. Just as importantly, there would 
be no ensuing disadvantages. The community would be no less safe 
and confidence in the markets would not diminish. 
It is particularly opportune and timely to consider these reforms 
given the recognition that there are now too many Americans in 
United States prisons.12 It costs taxpayers in the United States on 
10. Which, as discussed below, is the theory that higher penalties deter 
crime. 
11. See, e.g., Hristova, supra note 1, at 296-99 (discussing the effect of over 
criminalization in white-collar crime and its deterrent effect).
12. More than 2 million Americans are in federal prisons, state prisons, and 
local jails. For a breakdown of the incarceration numbers, see Pete Wagner and 
Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2015, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE
(Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2015.html [https://perma.cc/ 
2C6Z-TTEE]. This is an imprisonment rate of approximately 700 adults for every 
100,000 of the adult population. Melissa S. Kearney et al., Ten Economic Facts About 
Crime and Incarceration in the United States, HAMILTON PROJECT 9 (May 2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/v8_THP_10CrimeFacts.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/77NS-QQKW]. This rate has increased more than four-fold over the 
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average $31,000 in direct expenditures to house a prisoner for one 
year.13 The total spending on prisons is now over $80 billion 
annually.14 The scale of this, even for the world’s largest economy, is 
considerable, especially when overall the total expenditure on the 
criminal justice system is $270 billion annually—equating to nearly 
$1,000 per capita.15 The climate is now right for a deeper look at 
serious changes to the sentencing system. This Article progresses 
that debate. 
In this Article, we focus principally on insider trading and 
market manipulation offenses in the United States. For comparative 
purposes, we also discuss the sentencing of white-collar offenders in 
Australia. It emerges that despite the strikingly different sentencing 
regimes in these countries, both systems make similar mistakes in 
sentencing financial market offenders. Moreover, an examination of 
insider trading and market manipulation offenses in Australia 
enables us to broaden the scope of our empirical analysis and test the 
past 40 years. Incarceration, SENT’G PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
template/page.cfm?id=107 [https://perma.cc/KJ6W-CU9S] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016); 
see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 68 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & 
Steve Redburn eds., 2014). The United States now has the highest incarceration rate in 
the developed world, and by a considerable margin. See Wagner and Rabuy, supra.
The imprisonment rate in most developed countries is five to ten times less than the 
United States, and on average is six times that of a typical nation in the Organization 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). Rates in the OECD range 
from 47 to 266 per 100,000 adult population. Kearney et al., supra, at 10; see also
Nick Wing, Here Are All of the Nations that Incarcerate More of Their Population 
than the U.S., HUFFINGTON POST (May 4, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/08/13/incarceration-rate-per-capita_n_3745291.html [https://perma.cc/4B82-E4E8] 
(“At 716 per 100,000 people in 2013, according to the International Centre for Prison 
Studies, the U.S. tops every other nation in the world. Among OECD countries, the 
competition isn’t even close – Israel comes in second, at 223 per 100,000.”). 
13. According to a study by the Vera Justice Center, the average cost of a 
prisoner is $31,286 per year. This is higher in some states and cities. For example, in 
New York State the average cost is $60,000 per year and in New York City it is 
$167,731 per year. See Marc Santora, City’s Annual Cost Per Inmate is $168,000, 
Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/ 
nyregion/citys-annual-cost-per-inmate-is-nearly-168000-study-says.html?_r=0 [https:// 
perma.cc/C598-RBKY]. 
14. Kearney et al., supra note 12, at 13. This is $260 per capita. Press 
Release, The White House, CEA Report: Economic Perspective on Incarceration 
and the Criminal Justice System (Apr. 23, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2016/04/23/cea-report-economic-perspectives-incarceration-and-criminal-
justice [https://perma.cc/GRZ9-83VQ].
15. See Press Release, The White House, supra note 14.
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connection between sentences for serious market cheating offenses 
and the value of the stock market. 
In the next part of the Article, we define the key terms and 
concepts discussed in the Article. Part II of the Article explains the 
existing sentencing approach in the United States and Australia and 
sets out the most significant penalties that have been imposed for 
insider trading and market manipulation offenses. This is followed in 
Part III by an analysis of the key relevant sentencing objectives that 
can be secured through the sentencing system. In this Part, we also 
set out the results of our empirical study, which analyzes whether 
there is a link between market crime and the value of the stock 
market. In Part IV, we establish that the principle of proportionality 
should be the cardinal consideration in sentencing. This Part of the 
Article also contains concrete illustrations of the types of sentences 
that should be imposed in fraud cases. The reform recommendations 
are summarized in the concluding remarks. 
I. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 
There is no universally accepted definition of white-collar 
crime, despite the concept first being introduced nearly eighty years 
ago by Edwin Sutherland as a crime “committed by a person of 
respectability and high social status in the course of his 
occupation.”16 This definition is inadequate because notions such as 
“respectability” and “social status” are too obscure to be 
meaningful,17 and white-collar offending clearly transcends 
occupational or workplace transgressions.18
In a more recent analysis of white-collar crime in his book, 
Lying, Cheating, and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-Collar 
Crime, Stuart Green declines to attempt an exhaustive definition of 
what is encompassed by the concept. He notes that the conduct often 
concerns behavior at the margins of the criminal spectrum but that 
16. This was the description given by Sutherland in a speech he delivered to 
the American Sociological Society in 1939. See J. KELLY STRADER,
UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 1 (3d ed. 2011).
17. Richard Quinney, The Study of White-Collar Crime: Toward a Re-
orientation in Theory and Practice, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: OFFENSES IN 
BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND THE PROFESSIONS 285 (Gilbert Geis & Robert F. Meier 
eds., 1977).
18. For a discussion of the evolution of the white-collar terminology, see 
Kam C. Wong, From White-Collar Crime to Organizational Crime: An Intellectual 
History, 12 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J.L. 14 (2005). 
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there is no universally accepted definition of “white-collar crime.” 
He believes that there does not seem to be a single characteristic 
criterion that all forms of white-collar crime share.19
While there is no consensus on the definition of a white-collar 
crime, a working definition is important for a coherent analysis of 
existing jurisprudence. To that end, one of us has previously asserted 
that a white-collar crime involves an action of taking money or 
property (such as shares) or avoiding a legal obligation (such as a tax 
liability) without legal justification by an individual who is in a 
position of substantial influence regarding the relevant transaction.20
The discussion in this Article focuses on two paradigm 
instances of white-collar offending, both of which often attract a 
large degree of public opprobrium and often publicity. The first 
offense is insider trading. In the United States, section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the associated rule 10b-5
“prohibits individuals from using interstate commerce, the mail, or a 
national securities exchange to (i) use a device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, (ii) make any untrue or misleading statements of material 
19. STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY 
OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 18 (2006). The elusive nature of the definition of white-
collar crime is further illustrated by the fact that J. Kelly Strader attempts to 
demarcate it by what it is not. See STRADER, supra note 16, at 2. According to 
Strader, a white collar crime is one that does not: (a) necessarily involve force 
against a person or property; (b) directly relate to the possession, sale, or distribution 
of narcotics; (c) directly relate to organized crime activities; (d) directly relate to 
such national policies as immigration, civil rights, and national security; or 
(e) directly involve “vice crimes” or the common theft of property. Id.
20. See Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, A Rational Approach to 
Sentencing White-Collar Offenders in Australia, 34 ADELAIDE L. REV. 317 (2013). 
This is similar to the partial definition proposed by the United States Department of 
Justice, which gave a partial definition of white-collar crime in the following terms:
Nonviolent crime for financial gain committed by means of deception 
by persons whose occupational status is entrepreneurial, professional or 
semi-professional and utilizing their special occupational skills and 
opportunities; also, nonviolent crime for financial gain utilizing 
deception and committed by anyone having special technical and 
professional knowledge of business and government, irrespective of the 
person’s occupation.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DICTIONARY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA 
TERMINOLOGY 215 (2d ed. 1981), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/ 
76939NCJRS. pdf [https://perma.cc/HLA4-4EXW]. 
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fact, or (iii) engage in any conduct that would be a fraud or deceit on 
a person in the purchase or sale of any security.”21
A narrower definition is adopted in Australia. The 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) states that a person who possesses 
inside information22 is prohibited from (either as agent or principal) 
acquiring or disposing the relevant financial product, enter into 
agreements to that effect, or procure another to enter into such 
agreements.23 The persons in possession of price-sensitive 
information are also prohibited from giving the information to 
another if they know or reasonably ought to know that the person 
receiving the knowledge would likely engage in the conduct listed 
above.24
Market manipulation is defined and applied similarly in both 
jurisdictions. In the United States, a person is prohibited from 
willingly creating misleading appearances of active trading in 
securities listed on a stock exchange.25 In Australia, it is defined as a 
prohibition from taking part in or carrying out (directly or indirectly) 
a transaction that has or is likely to create or maintain an artificial 
price of the relevant financial product.26
The key aspect of insider trading and market manipulation 
offenses is that while often the offender makes a financial gain or 
avoids a loss, generally there is no discernible concrete loss to any 
particular shareholder or other individual. In circumstances where it 
is feasible to approximate a loss to a particular shareholder, the loss 
is generally quite small. In this way, insider trading offenses and 
market manipulation are distinguishable from most other white-
collar offenses.27 Most other white-collar offenses involve 
21. Anna Driggers, supra note 1, at 2024-25; see also Amy Dominick 
Padgett, United States v. Nacchio: The Tenth Circuit’s Civil Approach to Sentencing 
for Insider Trading, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 579, 581-82 (2011).
22. Information which is not generally available, and if it were, a 
reasonable person would expect it to have a particular effect on the price of the 
particular financial product in question. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) § 1042A.
23. Id. § 1043A(1).
24. GREGORY LYON & JEAN DU PLESSIS, THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING IN 
AUSTRALIA 2-4 (2005); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) § 1043A(2).
25. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a).
26. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) § 1041A.
27. As Peter Henning suggests in a New York Times article, “Insider 
trading is different from corporate accounting fraud because it does not have the 
same effect on individual investors. . . . [Insider trading] has little direct 
consequence for investors because the transactions take place on anonymous 
markets.” Peter J. Henning, Punishments for Insider Trading are Growing Stiffer,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2014, 10:44 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/ 
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identifiable victims and losses that are clearly ascertainable; for 
example, where a lawyer or accountant steals trust funds belonging 
to clients. 
In the case of insider trading, the persons who sell their shares 
to persons with inside information are prepared to sell the shares at 
that particular price or buy the shares at a particular price without 
having knowledge about information that might affect the price. In 
both situations, the loss for the victims is reflected in the adjustment 
that would occur, either upwards or downwards, when the price-
sensitive information becomes known.28 The same considerations 
apply to market manipulation. Even though those who trade would 
not know that the market has been manipulated, they are prepared to 
trade. In other words, they make decisions based on their own desire 
either to buy or sell securities—it is a rational subjective decision 
they make. Those who manipulated the market obviously get an 
unfair advantage, but there may be many other investors, not 
knowing that the market was manipulated, who would sell their 
securities and therefore avoid receiving a lower price for their 
securities when the security price is adjusted downwards when it 
becomes known that there was market manipulation. It is true that 
those buying the shares would be affected by the lower security 
price, but they were not “harmed” by those who sold their securities 
without knowledge that the market was manipulated. 
Thus, it is not contended that insider trading and market 
manipulation offenses are victimless from the perspective of the 
punishments-for-insider-trading-are-growing-stiffer/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/X6EV-
NFT9]. It is largely for this reason that some scholars that suggested that insider 
trading should not be a crime. For example, see the arguments set out in Hristova, 
supra note 1.
28. Moreover, some studies have found that even insider trading, which 
involves large amounts of shares, has only a limited impact on the price of shares. 
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 636-37 (1984); Pierre Collin-Dufresne & 
Vyacheslav Fos, Insider Trading, Stochastic Liquidity and Equilibrium Prices 5
(NBER, Working Paper No. 18451, 2012). There is some evidence that insider 
traders achieve better returns because they are better informed about factors that 
influence a stock price. H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders’ Profits, Costs of Trading, and 
Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 189, 210 (1986). But see John S. Hughes, Jing 
Liu & Jun Liu, Information Asymmetry, Diversification, and Cost of Capital, 82 
ACCT. REV. 705, 723 (2007). It has been argued that insider trading in fact enhances 
market liquidity because it increases the volume of trades. See Charles Cao, Laura 
Casares Field & Gordon Hanka, Does Insider Trading Impair Market Liquidity? 
Evidence from IPO Lockup Expirations, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 25, 
27 (2004). 
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individual. Rather, as opposed to other white-collar offenses, they 
often involve no identifiable victims and when they do, the losses are 
generally not considerable—they are a portion of a share price as 
opposed to, say, an individual’s life savings.
II. THE EXISTING SENTENCING FRAMEWORK
Before examining the legal framework for insider trading and 
market manipulation offenses, it is useful to provide an overview of 
the overarching sentencing regimes in the United States and 
Australia. 
A. Sentencing Law in the United States: An Overview 
Each state in the United States and the federal jurisdiction has 
its own separate sentencing system.29 While each system is different, 
there are important commonalities. The main objectives of 
sentencing are similar and come in the form of community protection 
(also known as incapacitation), general deterrence, specific 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.30 While these aims are 
relatively uniform, they are not equal in weight. Community 
protection has been the overwhelming aim of sentencing in the 
United States over the past forty years.31
The goal of community protection has been most demonstrably 
pursued through the enactment of prescriptive sentencing laws.32
29. Sentencing (and more generally, criminal law) in the United States is 
mainly the province of states. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 
(2000) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)). The sentencing 
framework regarding federal offenses in general is derived from Mirko Bagaric, 
From Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing: Reducing the Rate of Imprisonment 
and Crime While Saving Billions of Taxpayer Dollars, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 349, 
413 (2014). 
30. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL 1 (2014) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2014], http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/2014/2014-ussc-guidelines-manual 
[https://perma.cc/Y8M5-S4TJ]. 
31. THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12, at 9.
32. Id. at 3. As noted by William W. Berry III, 
Prior to 1984, federal judges possessed discretion that was virtually 
“unfettered” in determining sentences, guided only by broad sentence 
ranges provided by federal criminal statutes. The Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984 (the “Act”) moved the sentencing regime almost 
completely to the other extreme, implementing a system of mandatory 
guidelines that severely limited the discretion of the sentencing judge. 
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Fixed, minimum, or presumptive penalties33 now apply (to varying 
degrees) in jurisdictions in the United States.34 Prescribed penalties 
are typically set out in sentencing grids, which normally use criminal 
history scores35 and offense seriousness to calculate the appropriate 
penalty.36 The penalties prescribed in the grids have been heavily 
criticized for being too harsh. Typical of this sentiment is the 
following observation by Michael Tonry:
Anyone who works in or has observed the American criminal justice 
system over time can repeat the litany of tough-on-crime sentencing laws 
enacted in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s: mandatory minimum 
sentence laws (all 50 states), three-strikes laws (26 states), [life-without-
possibility-of-parole] laws (49 states), and truth-in-sentencing laws (28 
states), in some places augmented by equally severe “career criminal,” 
“dangerous offender,” and “sexual predator” laws (Tonry, 2013). These 
laws, because they required sentences of historically unprecedented 
lengths for broad categories of offenses and offenders, are the primary 
causes of contemporary levels of imprisonment.37
The most extensively analyzed prescribed penalty laws are in 
the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (the 
“Federal Sentencing Guidelines”).38 Guidelines are important 
because of the large number of offenders sentenced under this 
system and the significant doctrinal influence they have exerted at 
William W. Berry III, Discretion Without Guidance: The Need to Give Meaning to 
§ 3553 After Booker and its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631, 633 (2008).
33. For the purposes of clarity, these both come under the terminology of 
fixed or standard penalties in this Article.
34. They are also one of the key distinguishing aspects of the United 
States’s sentencing system compared to that of Australia (and most other sentencing 
systems in the world). See CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U.S.
SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 46-47 (2012) (noting that 137 of 168 
surveyed countries had some form of minimum penalties, but none of the others 
were as wide-ranging or severe as in the United States).
35. This is based mainly on the number, seriousness, and age of the prior 
convictions.
36. Michael Tonry, Remodeling American Sentencing: A Blueprint for 
Moving Past Mass Incarceration, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 503, 519 (2014).
37. Id. at 514; see also Michael Tonry, The Questionable Relevance of 
Previous Convictions to Punishments for Later Crimes, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS 
AT SENTENCING 91 (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010). For further 
criticism of the Guidelines, see Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and 
Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 92-93 (2005); 
James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 175 (2010); 
Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 37, 40 (2006).
38. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014, supra note 30, at 394.
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the state level.39 Like most grid sentencing systems, the key 
considerations that determine the nature of the penalty are the 
perceived severity of the offense and the criminal history of the 
offender.40 Prior convictions can have a considerable impact on 
penalty, and in some cases lead to an approximate doubling of the 
sentence. For example, an offense at level 15 in the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines carries a presumptive penalty for a first 
offender of imprisonment for 18-24 months,41 which increases to 41-
51 months for an offender with 13 or more criminal history points.42
For an offense at level 35, a first offender has a guideline penalty 
range of 168-210 months, which increases to 292-365 months for an 
offender with the highest criminal history score.43 Thus, an extensive 
bad criminal history can add 155 months (more than 12 years) to a 
jail term.
Following the U.S. Supreme Court decision of United States v. 
Booker,44 the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are no longer 
39. See Berman & Bibas, supra note 37, at 38. There are more than 200,000 
federal prisoners. See E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2013, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 2
(Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
9UXM-DHZP].
40. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing 
Factors?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1109, 1109 (2008).
41. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014, supra note 30, at 400. The offense 
levels range from 1 (least serious) to 43 (most serious). Id.
42. Id. The criminal history score ranges from 0 to 13 or more (worst 
offending record). Id.
43. Id.
44. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In Booker, the Supreme 
Court held that aspects of the Guidelines that were mandatory were contrary to the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Id. at 258-59 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also
Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1236 (2011) (“[W]hen a defendant’s 
sentence has been set aside on appeal, a district court at resentencing may consider 
evidence [that may] support a downward variance from the now-advisory Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines range.”); Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 715 (2008) 
(“[T]here is no longer a limit comparable to the one at issue in Burns on the 
variances from Guidelines ranges that a district court may find justified under the 
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”); Greenlaw v. United States, 
554 U.S. 237 (2008); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 38-39 (2007) (“[W]hile the 
extent of the difference between a particular sentence and the recommended 
Guidelines range is relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentences—whether 
inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a 
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 
(2007) (stating that a federal appellate court may apply presumption of 
reasonableness to a district court sentence that is within the properly calculated 
Sentencing Guidelines range).
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mandatory; rather they are effectively advisory in character.45
Nevertheless, the guideline range remains an influential sentencing 
reference point. Until recently, sentences within the Guidelines were 
still the norm.46 In 2014, for the first time, federal courts imposed 
more sentences that were outside the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
than sentences that were within them. The margin is small (54% to 
46%), but it does reflect a trend by the judiciary to view the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines with less stricture than previously.47
While criminal history score and offense severity are the main 
sentencing considerations, they do not exhaust all of the matters that 
influence the penalty. Courts can depart from a guideline for a 
number of reasons. The Guidelines expressly set out over three 
dozen considerations that can affect the penalty.48 To determine the 
45. Consequently, District Courts are required to properly calculate and 
consider the Guidelines when sentencing, even in an advisory guideline system. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)-(5) (2010); Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (“The district courts, 
while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must . . . take them into account when 
sentencing.”); Rita, 551 U.S. at 351 (stating that a district court should begin all 
sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range); 
Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 (“As a matter of administration and to secure nationwide 
consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark.”). 
The district court, in determining the appropriate sentence in a particular case, 
therefore, must consider the properly calculated guideline range, the grounds for 
departure provided in the policy statements, and then the factors under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a). See Rita, 551 U.S. at 350-51; see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 38 (“A district 
judge must consider the extent of any departure from the Guidelines and must 
explain the appropriateness of an unusually lenient or harsh sentence with sufficient 
justifications. An appellate court may take the degree of variance into account and 
consider the extent of a deviation from the Guidelines, but it may not require 
‘extraordinary’ circumstances or employ a rigid mathematical formula using a 
departure’s percentage as the standard for determining the strength of the 
justification required for a specific sentence.”).
46. Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of 
Prior Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1160 
(2010); see also Amy Baron-Evans & Jennifer Niles Coffin, No More Math Without 
Subtraction: Deconstructing the Guidelines’ Prohibitions and Restrictions on 
Mitigating Factors, DEF. SERV. OFF. TRAINING DIVISION 1 (November 1, 2010), 
https://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics-sentencing/no_more_math_without_subtraction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UB55-72FC]. For a discussion regarding the potential of 
mitigating factors to have a greater role in federal sentencing, see William W. Berry 
III, Mitigation in Federal Sentencing in the United States, in MITIGATION AND 
AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 247 (Julian V. Roberts ed., 2011).
47. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 1 (2014),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-
statistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC-2014_Quarterly_Report_Final.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Q7ZH-RHGT].
48. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014, supra note 30, at 457.
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appropriate guideline penalty, courts may factor in a number of 
mitigating and aggravating considerations.49 They come in two main 
forms: adjustments and departures.
“Adjustments” are considerations that increase or decrease
penalty by a designated amount.50 For example, a demonstration of 
remorse can result in a decrease of penalty by up to two levels; it can 
decrease three levels if it is accompanied by an early guilty plea.51
“Departures”52 more readily enable courts to impose a sentence 
outside the applicable Guideline range.53 Further, pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3553, in rare instances considerations that are not set out in 
the Guidelines can be invoked to justify departing from the range.54
Where a court departs from the applicable range, it is required to 
state its reason.55
B. Sentencing Law in the United States: Insider Trading 
So far as white-collar offenders are concerned, they are subject 
to the general sentencing principles. However, there are also some 
sentencing principles that apply more acutely to white-collar crime 
offenders. White-collar crime sentences are similar to other federal 
drug crimes in terms of sentencing, but rather than using quantity to 
determine a sentence, sentencing for white-collar crime has as a key 
focus the amount of economic loss caused by the crime. 
In recent decades in the United States, an attitude developed 
that white-collar crime defendants were given an unreasonable 
degree of leniency in sentences, and that the punishment did not fit 
49. See id. at 6; 18 USC § 3553(b)(1).
50. These are set out in Chapter 3 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014, supra note 30, at 341.
51. Id. at 371. However, § 5K2.0(d)(4) of the 2014 Guidelines provides that 
the court cannot depart from a guideline range as a result of: 
The defendant’s decision, in and of itself, to plead guilty to the offense 
or to enter a plea agreement with respect to the offense (i.e., a departure 
may not be based merely on the fact that the defendant decided to plead 
guilty or to enter into a plea agreement, but a departure may be based on 
justifiable, non-prohibited reasons as part of a sentence that is 
recommended, or agreed to, in the plea agreement and accepted by the 
court.
Id. at 460 (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 457.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 458; see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007); 
Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1247 (2011).
55. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014, supra note 30, at 461.
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the crime.56 There was an enormous amount of political pressure to 
amend the sentencing guidelines for white-collar crime, and as a 
result, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act went into effect.57 Following the 
enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, penalties for white-collar 
crimes increased by twenty-five percent,58 with the amount of “loss” 
being the overarching factor in determining a sentence.59
More recently, in April 2015, there were proposed amendments 
for the sentencing guidelines dealing with white-collar crime. The 
proposed changes to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines came into 
effect on November 1, 2015.60 These changes not only encompassed 
a number of major revisions to the law, including new definitions in 
the commentary, but also made the recommended sentences so 
severe that it has been suggested by some prosecutors and judges that 
they may no longer be taken seriously.61 The changes, as summarized 
below, focus mainly on the defendant’s intent and motive, as well as 
the amount of loss as a result of the offense. 
Section 2B1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provides 
the framework for the sentencing of white-collar criminals.62 There 
are three main considerations that are relevant to the sentencing of 
56. See Jamie Gustafson, Cracking Down on White-Collar Crime: An 
Analysis of the Recent Trend of Severe Sentences for Corporate Officers, 40 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 685, 692 (2007). 
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2015), [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015], http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/2015/2015-chapter-2-c#2b11 
[https://perma.cc/9BDX-BDRM]; see also Christopher P. Conniff, Steven S. 
Goldschmidt & Helen Gugel, Sentencing Guidelines for Insider Trading: Recent
Amendments Create Greater Disparity, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 43, 43 & n.6 (2013); 
Danielle DeMasi Chattin, The More You Gain, the More You Lose: Sentencing Insider 
Trading Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 165 (2010).
60. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015, supra note 59, § 2B1.1 historical note. 
For a discussion regarding the desirability of redefining the concept of “gain” for 
insider trading offenses, see Soo Ji Jung, U.S. v. Rajaratnam – No “Gain” Without 
Pain: Amending the Sentencing Guidelines for Insider Trading to Better Reflect the 
Rapidly Evolving Financial Industry, 40 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
295 (2014).
61. Dana Liebelson, Why Nobody is Really Happy with New Guidelines for 
Punishing White-Collar Criminals, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 22, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/22/white-collar-sentencing-reform_n_7119826. 
html [https://perma.cc/TW9F-WXT8].
62. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015, supra note 59, § 2B1.1.
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such offenders: (1) economic loss; (2) culpability; and (3) victim 
impact.63 We now consider each of these in greater detail. 
Most important of these three main considerations is loss. 
Under the Guidelines, the base offense level for white-collar crimes 
is 6-8.64 The Guidelines provide a “loss” table to determine how 
many levels to add to the offense based on the amount of economic 
“loss” attributable to the defendant’s crime.65 Loss is not simply 
defined as the amount of money lost during the commission of the 
crime, but rather, the Guidelines define what constitutes a “loss” as it 
relates to white-collar crime. “Loss” is the greater of actual loss or 
intended loss.66
“‘Actual loss’ means the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary 
harm that resulted from the offense.”67 “Intended loss (I) means the 
pecuniary harm that the defendant purposely sought to inflict; and 
(II) includes intended pecuniary harm that would have been 
impossible or unlikely to occur (e.g., as in a government sting 
operation or an insurance fraud in which the claim exceeded the 
insured value).”68 The Guidelines then determine the sentencing 
range based on a combination of the offense level and the offender’s 
criminal history.69
As the Guidelines suggest, the greater the loss as a result of the 
crime, the more likely a judge will apply an increase in the 
sentencing adjustment. For example, if the loss exceeded $6,500, the 
offense level can increase anywhere from 2 levels up to 30 levels.70
Thus, if the loss incurred was $6,500 or less, and the offender has no 
criminal history, the offender may face up to six months 
imprisonment.71 However, at the other end of the spectrum, if the 
loss involved more than $550,000,000, then 30 points would be 
63. A Report on Behalf of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice 
Section Task Force on the Reform of Federal Sentencing for Economic Crimes, AM.
BAR ASS’N: CRIM. JUST. SEC. 1, 5 (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/uncategorized/criminal_justice/economic_crimes.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZVW4-WDUG].
64. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015, supra note 59, § 2B1.1(a). 
65. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1).
66. Id. application note 3(A).
67. Id. application note 3(A)(i).
68. Id. application note 3(A)(ii).
69. Id.; U.S SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCING TABLE (2015) [hereinafter 
GUIDELINES SENTENCING TABLE 2015], http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
guidelines-manual/2015/Sentencing_Table.pdf [https://perma.cc/AL9U-78VQ].
70. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015, supra note 59, § 2B1.1.
71. GUIDELINES SENTENCING TABLE 2015, supra note 69.
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added to the offense level.72 This means that an offender with no 
criminal history, at minimum, could face 97-121 months 
imprisonment.73 This increase in levels is determined even before 
any other aggravating or mitigating factors are taken into 
consideration at sentencing.
Further sentencing points may be added to the offense level 
based on the offender’s level of culpability. The Guidelines have five 
levels of culpability that range from lowest to highest.74 The level of 
culpability for any given case will depend on a number of factors, 
including, but not limited to, the defendant’s motive; the correlation 
between the amount of loss and the amount of the defendant’s gain; 
the degree to which the offense and the defendant’s contribution to it 
was sophisticated or organized; the duration of the offense; 
extenuating circumstances in connection with the offense; whether 
the defendant initiated the offense or merely joined in criminal 
conduct initiated by others; and whether the defendant took steps to 
mitigate the harm from the offense.75 Unlike for the amount of loss, 
the Guidelines do not assign a numeric score to each of the 
culpability factors listed above. Rather, the court determines one of 
the five culpability levels after taking the culpability factors together 
in totality.76
One factor that is highly relevant to the defendant’s culpability 
level is the defendant’s motive. The American Bar Association has 
recognized four main motives. From most to least serious they are as 
follows: predatory, legitimate ab initio, risk shifting, and 
gatekeeping.77 Predatory offenses are intended to inflict loss for the 
sole purpose of personal gain to the defendant.78 Legitimate ab initio 
offenses typically “arise from otherwise legitimate efforts that have 
crossed over into criminality as a result of unexpected difficulties,” 
and these rank lower than predatory offenses.79 Below legitimate ab 
initio offenses are risk-shifting offenses, which shift any potential 
risk of loss from the defendant to a third party, such as the victim of 
72. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015, supra note 59, § 2B1.1.
73. GUIDELINES SENTENCING TABLE 2015, supra note 69.
74. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 63, at 1.
75. Id. 
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2-3. 
78. Id. at 2. 
79. Id. at 3.
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the crime.80 Lastly, gatekeeping offenses are not intended to cause 
loss, but, rather, “they violate so-called ‘gatekeeping’ requirements 
intended generally to prevent practices that create potential loss or 
[actual] risk of loss.”81 It is possible for an offense to fit into more 
than one of the four categories. The court should also consider how 
the defendant’s motive compares to that of other defendants 
sentenced under this section of the Guidelines.82
The next consideration that informs culpability is the amount of 
gain and whether it correlates with the amount of loss. Where the 
defendant commits the offense and gains an amount that is 
commensurate with the loss, this will result in a higher degree of 
culpability.83 Likewise, at the opposite end, where the defendant 
derives little to no gain from the offense, this will typically indicate a 
lesser degree of culpability.84 On the same note, where the defendant 
personally gains as a direct result of the offense, this will also be 
relevant to assigning a culpability level.85 However, a small amount 
of personal gain in relation to the amount of loss does not always 
indicate a lower level of culpability.86
The defendant’s degree of sophistication or organization of the 
crime is also considered for culpability purposes. Generally, where 
the crime is of a higher level of sophistication, it follows that the 
defendant receives a higher level of culpability.87 The opposite is 
also true: Where the crime is carried out in a simple manner without 
a high degree of organization, this reflects a lower level of 
culpability for the offender.88 The next factor, duration, follows the 
same general principles as the degree of sophistication of the crime. 
A longer duration of the crime (several months) indicates a higher 
degree of culpability for the defendant.89
80. Id. An example would be making a false statement for the purpose of 
obtaining a bank loan that is intended to be repaid. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 4.
85. Id.
86. Id. “For example, a defendant who intentionally inflicts a large loss on 
others for the purpose of achieving a small gain would be more culpable with 
respect to the gain factor than someone who did not intend the loss.” Id. This is 
likely because of the intent element being present, coupled with motive, even where 
the gain to the defendant is little to none.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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Another factor to consider for culpability levels is whether
there were any extenuating circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the crime. The most notable would be coercion or 
duress. Following the same general principles as the factors above, a 
defendant’s culpability will be affected by the nature of any 
extenuating circumstances.90
The last consideration that is relevant to culpability is any 
effort to mitigate the harm stemming from the offense. This may 
include voluntary cessation of the crime, self-reporting, or 
restitution.91 Where there is evidence of mitigating factors, the 
defendant’s level of culpability will typically decrease.92 Even where 
the defendant’s mitigating efforts do not rise to the level of a valid 
legal defense, the court may still take his efforts into consideration to 
determine his level of culpability.93
In addition to points being added to the defendant’s offense 
level for loss and culpability, points may also be added due to the 
loss incurred by the victim. The Guidelines first take into account 
how many victims were involved as a result of the offense, and 
whether the victim(s) suffered a substantial financial hardship.94
Where there are a higher number of victims involved, and where 
those victims suffer a substantial financial hardship, the defendant’s 
offense level will be increased.95
Other factors taken into consideration within victim impact 
include: vulnerability of victims, other non-economic harm, and 
victim inducement of offense. Where the defendant targeted victims 
because of some vulnerability, the defendant’s offense level will be 
increased.96 This tends to go hand in hand with motive and 
culpability.97 Where the victim(s) suffer some non-economic injury, 
such as a personal injury, this may not be measurable, or reflected, in 
the Guidelines “loss” table. Thus, the Guidelines may underestimate 
the seriousness of the offense in some cases. The court must 
therefore take into consideration the victim’s non-economic harm, if 
any.98 Lastly, in some cases, the victim may have contributed to the 
90. Id. at 5.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015, supra note 59, § 2B1.1(b).
95. See id.; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 63, at 5.
96. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 63, at 5. 
97. See id. at 3. 
98. See id. at 5. 
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crime in some manner—e.g., by inducing the commission of the 
crime or engaging in some lesser degree of culpable conduct.99 If the 
victim at all contributed to the crime, it may be appropriate to 
discount the impact of the victim, and potentially decrease the 
severity of the offense for the defendant.100
In recent years, even before the proposed changes to the 
Guidelines were made, convictions for some white-collar criminals 
resulted in punishments that were comparable to life sentences.101
This could be the case even for a first time offender who posed little 
to no threat to public safety. Corporate accounting fraud and insider 
trading have resulted in some of the harshest penalties that the 
Guidelines recommend.102 While insider trading offenses rarely cause 
calculable and material loss to individual investors, this mitigating 
factor seems to be largely ignored when it comes to sentencing such 
offenders. 
The reality is that the sentences for insider trading have been 
increasing.103 Reuters conducted a five-year study ending in 
December 2013 that showed that insider trading defendants 
“received an average sentence of 17.3 months, up from 13.1 months 
during the previous five years, or a 31.8[%] increase.”104 The Reuters 
study, which focused only on insider trading, also follows the 
general trend: The average sentence in federal courts for § 2B1.1 
offenders (which includes fraud and other economic crimes) has 
steadily increased over the last five years.105 The reason for the 
increasing sentences seems to be a more general trend towards 
longer prison terms as evidenced by the recent amendments in the 
Guidelines. The trend toward longer sentences for white-collar crime 
99. See id. at 6. 
100. See id.
101. See infra Section IV.A.
102. Henning, supra note 27.
103. Id.
104. Nate Raymond, Insider Traders in U.S. Face Longer Prison Terms, 
Reuters Analysis Shows, REUTERS (Sept. 2, 2014, 7:52 AM) [hereinafter Reuters 
Analysis], http://www.reuters.com/article/us-insidertrading-prison-insight-
idUSKBN0GX0A820140902 [https://perma.cc/S7P9-BFP4]; see also Reuters Analysis 
Shows U.S. Judges Imposing Longer Prison Terms for Insider Trading, REUTERS 
BEST (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.reutersbest.com/articles/view/3438/reuters-analysis-
shows-us-judges-imposing-longer-prison-terms-for-insider-trading [https://perma.cc/ 
T3N4-U5XY].
105. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT FISCAL 
YEAR 2015 33 (2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC-2015_ 
Quarterly_Report_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8SX-FZRZ].
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is also thought to be driven in part by the bigger profits being earned 
through the illegal schemes, even where the victims experience no 
significant losses.106
Each American state has discrete laws relating to white-collar 
offending. Generally, the relevant sentencing provisions in the five 
largest U.S. states by population—California, Texas, Florida, New 
York, and Illinois107—are less prescriptive than in the federal 
jurisdiction. 
In California, while the amount of loss is the largest 
consideration in determining a sentence, there are several other 
factors that affect the outcome of white-collar offenses. One major 
factor California state courts consider is whether the white-collar 
offender has committed a “pattern of related felony conduct.”108
Under California Penal Code § 186.11, this enhancement is known 
as the aggravated white-collar crime enhancement.109 The amount of 
time added to the sentence hinges on how much loss was involved in 
the crime. 
California state courts recognize a number of mitigating factors 
for white-collar offenders. An important consideration is whether the 
offender voluntarily disclosed the crime.110 An offender who self-
surrenders in a California state court will receive more leniency than 
he would in a federal court.111
The precise location where the crime was committed may play 
a role as a factor in sentencing. If the crime was committed in a 
county with a rigid district attorney’s office, the prosecutor may be 
prohibited from suggesting a lighter sentence due to office policies. 
If it is a high-profile offense, then public pressure may also tie into 
the mix, making the chances for a light sentence unlikely.112
The second largest state is Texas. Under the Texas Penal Code, 
Chapter 12 outlines the punishments and penalties for white-collar 
offenders.113 Texas, much like California and the federal jurisdiction, 
focuses on the same main three principles discussed above. 
106. Reuters Analysis, supra note 104; Henning, supra note 27.
107. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www. 
census.gov/popclock/ [https://perma.cc/P5SH-D626] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
108. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.11 (West 2012).
109. Id.
110. Gary S. Lincenberg & Jason D. Kogan, Advising Individuals on When 
and How to Self-Report Wrongdoing, L.A. LAW., Oct. 2003, at 21. 
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.51 (West 2015).
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However, Texas state courts apply additional principles for 
sentencing white-collar crime offenders. While Chapter 12 of the 
Texas Penal Code defines the basic statutory penalties, Texas state 
courts may depart from these guidelines. An additional consideration 
that may aggravate white-collar sentences in Texas114 is the nature of 
the victim. Thus crimes committed against vulnerable victims are 
deemed to be more serious.115
The third largest state by population is Florida. While the first 
two states discussed generally focus mostly on the three main factors 
(loss, culpability, and victim impact), Florida relies more heavily on 
victim impact than any other factor. There is a detailed legislative 
framework dealing with this consideration. Due to the frequency 
with which victims are deceived and cheated by criminals who 
commit nonviolent frauds, frequently through the use of the Internet 
and other electronic technology, the Florida Legislature created and 
enacted the White Collar Crime Victim Protection Act.116 The 
purposes of the White Collar Crime Victim Protection Act are to 
enhance the sanctions imposed for nonviolent frauds and swindles, 
protect the public’s property, and assist in prosecuting white-collar 
criminals.117
Under the White Collar Crime Victim Protection Act, an 
offender commits an “aggravated white collar crime” when he 
“engag[es] in at least two white-collar crimes that have the same or 
similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of 
commission, or that are otherwise interrelated.”118 Thus, this statute 
is geared towards crimes that encompass larger schemes involving 
fraud, rather than isolated incidents. 
Next is New York, the fourth largest state. New York’s Penal 
Law breaks down each type of white-collar crime and the elements 
of each offense with greater particularity than the other 
jurisdictions.119 New York’s overall sentencing structure is also 
notable. Two types of sentences are possible, depending on the type 
of crime committed; either a “determinate” or an “indeterminate” 
sentence may be imposed. Determinate sentences are fixed and 
114. See id. § 12.42.
115. Id.
116. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.0844 (West 2014).
117. Id.
118. Id. § 775.0844(4).
119. New York Penal Law encompasses many sections dealing with types of 
white-collar crimes. For a more in depth review of the offenses, see N.Y. PENAL 
LAW §§ 155-158, 170-177, 180-190 (McKinney 2016).
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cannot be changed by a parole board or any other agency.120
Indeterminate sentences occur when the judge sets a range and 
parole boards subsequently determine when, within the given range, 
the offender is ready to be released from prison.121
Over time, the New York State Legislature has reformed its 
sentencing structures and has ultimately switched which crimes fall 
into each respective type of sentence. The Legislature determined 
that first-time and second-time felons who were convicted of violent 
felonies, drug offenders, and sex offenders whose felonies are non-
violent all fall into a determinate sentence.122 This left a category of 
some 200 offenses falling into an indeterminate sentence. Crimes 
that have an indeterminate sentence include non-violent, non-drug, 
and non-sex offenses, such as grand larceny, which is a white-collar 
crime.123 Thus, because white-collar crimes fall into the 
indeterminate sentencing category, New York has a broad discretion 
in considering factors at sentencing for white-collar crime offenders.
In New York, crimes are categorized into alphabetical classes 
“A” through “E.” The higher the class (such as “Class A”), the 
longer the minimum and maximum sentences that may be 
imposed.124 In regard to white-collar crimes, New York focuses 
mostly on economic loss, or the amount of money stolen.125 The 
amount of money stolen in a fraud scheme, for example, will 
determine the class in which the crime will be categorized. Where 
the offender steals property valued over one thousand dollars, he has 
committed larceny in the fourth degree, and this is a Class E 
felony.126 New York has different degrees of larceny, with the most 
severe being larceny in the first degree, which is where the offender 
120. See N.Y. STATE PERMANENT COMM’N ON SENTENCING, A PROPOSAL FOR 
“FULLY DETERMINATE” SENTENCING FOR NEW YORK STATE 3 (Dec. 2014), 
http://nycourts.gov/ip/sentencing/Determinate%20Sentencing%20Report%20Final%
20Delivered.pdf [https://perma.cc/CKR8-GWT5].
121. See id. at 2-3.
122. Id. at 3.
123. Id. at 4.
124. See id. at 6-7.
125. DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N OF THE STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE NEW 
YORK STATE WHITE COLLAR CRIME TASK FORCE 6 (Sept. 2013) [hereinafter WHITE 
COLLAR CRIME TASK FORCE], http://www.nyselderabuse.org/documents/WCTFReport. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZH2-EKWJ].
126. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.30 (McKinney 2010). Note that where the 
offender steals less than one thousand dollars, this is considered petit larceny, and is 
a Class A misdemeanor. Id. § 155.25.
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steals over one million dollars, and this is a considered a Class B 
felony.127
Thus, when larger sums of money are stolen, the offense will 
be placed into a higher class and the offender will receive a longer 
sentence. Likewise, where there is less money stolen, the crime will 
be placed into a lower class and the offender will have a shorter 
sentence. Because of the different degrees of crimes, and different 
classes, New York’s main focus in sentencing for white-collar 
crimes is on the economic loss sustained. 
Additionally, much like Florida, the state of New York takes 
into consideration the age of the victim.128 Fraud against the elderly 
is a growing problem in the United States, and especially in New 
York, which has the third-largest older adult population in the 
country.129
Lastly, the fifth largest state is Illinois, which has several state 
statutes that govern white-collar crimes. These statutes set forth the 
crimes that are included as white-collar crimes, as well as the 
elements of each offense.130 Similar to a few states above, Illinois 
mainly focuses on the dollar value of the property that was stolen.131
This encompasses the overarching factor of economic loss, but is 
more specific to the dollar amount lost. Not surprisingly then, the 
more money or value that was stolen through white-collar crime, the 
longer the sentence will be for the offender.132 However, the actual 
value at issue can be hard to determine, and there may be disputes 
over what certain property is worth. 
Illinois also focuses on a few other factors when dealing with 
sentencing white-collar crime offenders. Much like Florida, the state 
of Illinois will enhance a sentence for a white-collar crime where the 
offender committed the crime against a person age sixty or older.133
Illinois may also consider whether the offender stole from the 
government, from a school, or a place of worship and use these 
factors in sentencing.134
127. Id. § 155.42 (McKinney 1986).
128. WHITE COLLAR CRIME TASK FORCE, supra note 125, at 62.
129. Id.
130. See Ch. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/33-1 to -8 (West 2012); Ch. 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16 (West 2012). 
131. See Illinois Embezzlement Laws, FINDLAW, http://statelaws.findlaw. 
com/illinois-law/illinois-embezzlement-laws.html [https://perma.cc/Q3DC-QEZR] 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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Thus, the federal jurisdiction and the five largest U.S. states 
generally consider three main overarching factors at sentencing: 
(1) economic loss, (2) culpability, and (3) victim impact. However, 
there is a degree of divergence regarding the precise considerations 
that can aggravate and mitigate penalties for white-collar offenders. 
Thus, there is a considerable degree of convergence regarding 
the main considerations that in theory drive sentencing 
determinations in the relation to insider trading offenses. At the 
edges there are, however, differences regarding the precise factors 
that aggravate and mitigate penalties for such offenses, and there are 
also differences regarding the manner in which the concrete penalties 
for insider trading offenses are determined. As we have seen, some 
jurisdictions, such as the federal jurisdiction, have guideline 
penalties, while in other states the parameters of an appropriate 
penalty are less prescriptive.135 Despite this, the overwhelming trend 
relating to insider trading offenses is that the penalties are increasing. 
Moreover, the key rationales for the tough penalties (in the form of 
general deterrence and the desire to protect the integrity of the 
market) are uniform. It is to these considerations that we now turn.
C. United States Insider Trading: Examples of Heavy Penalties 
As we have seen, there is a degree of divergence in the various 
American jurisdictions regarding the exact considerations that inform 
sentences for insider trading offenses; however, a universal theme is 
that these offenses are generally punished severely. The post-2000
insider trading cases that attracted the heaviest penalties are as 
follows: 
135. In California, where an offender engages in market manipulation, 
insider trading, or makes a false or misleading statement in a securities transaction, 
the penalties include up to $10,000,000 in fines and/or two, three, or five years in 
county jail. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25540(b) (West 2011). In Texas, a white-collar 
offender may be charged with a felony in the first degree, which carries a maximum 
penalty of not more than ninety-nine years and not less than five years. TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. §§ 12.32, 34.02 (West 2015). In Florida, a white-collar crime 
constituting a felony in the first degree carries a maximum penalty of up to thirty 
years imprisonment. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(3)(b)(1) (West 2016). In New York,
the maximum penalty for someone who commits a white-collar crime is twenty-five 
years and is a Class B felony. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.42 (McKinney 1986); Id.
§ 70.00(2)(b) (McKinney 2009). Lastly, in Illinois, an offender who steals property 
or money over $10,000 has committed a Class 1 felony, which carries a maximum 
sentence of fifteen years. Ch. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-30(a) (West 2012). 
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Case Name and Court Date of
Sentence
Sentence (length of 
imprisonment)
1. U.S. v. Martoma,
48 F. Supp. 3d 555
September 8, 2014 9 years
2. U.S. v. Kluger, 722 
F.3d 549
July 9, 2013 12 years
3. U.S. v. Goffer, 721
F.3d 113
July 1, 2013 10 years
4. U.S. v. Bauer, 529 
F. App’x 275
June 27, 2013 9 years
5. U.S. v. 
Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 
139, 151 (2d Cir. 
2013)
October 13, 2011 11 years
6. U.S. v. Contorinis,
692 F.3d 136, 141 
(2d Cir. 2012)
December 17, 2010 6 years
7. U.S. v. Nacchio,
573 F.3d 1062
July 31, 2009 6 years
8. U.S. v. Royer, 549 
F.3d 886
December 17, 2008 9 years
9. U.S. v. Naseem
[Unreported U.S. 
District Court, 
S.D.N.Y.]
June 4, 2008 10 years
10. U.S. v. Waksal
[Unreported, U.S. 
District Court, 
S.D.N.Y.]
June 10, 2003 7 years, 3 months
The above discussion and illustrative sentences set out the 
precise considerations that inform the sanction that is imposed in a 
particular insider trading case and, as we have seen, considerations 
relating to the monetary amount and culpability are paramount. 
Underlying these considerations are the rationales for harsh 
sentences for offenders who commit insider trading offenses. To this 
end, there are two common justifications that are often invoked to 
justify stern penalties in such cases. The first is general deterrence. 
To this end, in United States v. Gupta it was noted: 
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As to specific deterrence, it seems obvious that, having suffered such a 
blow to his reputation, Mr. Gupta is unlikely to repeat his transgressions, 
and no further punishment is needed to achieve this result. General 
deterrence, however, suggests a different conclusion. As this Court has 
repeatedly noted in other cases, insider trading is an easy crime to commit 
but a difficult crime to catch. Others similarly situated to the defendant 
must therefore be made to understand that when you get caught, you will 
go to jail. Defendant’s proposals to have Mr. Gupta undertake various 
innovative forms of community service would, in the Court’s view, totally 
fail to send this message. Moreover, if the reports of Mr. Gupta’s 
charitable endeavors are at all accurate, he can be counted on to devote 
himself to community service when he finishes any prison term, regardless 
of any order of the Court.136
Similarly, in SEC v. Happ, the First Circuit discussed general 
deterrence as it relates to insider trading:
The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (“ITSFEA”) 
authorizes courts to impose a penalty of up to “three times the profit 
gained or loss avoided” as a result of the insider trading. ITSFEA civil 
penalties were enacted to “enhance deterrence against insider trading, and 
where deterrence fails, to augment the current methods of detection and 
punishment of this behavior.” We review an order imposing a civil penalty 
for abuse of discretion. A court may consider several factors in evaluating 
whether or not to assess civil penalties, such as: (1) the egregiousness of 
the violations; (2) the isolated or repeated nature of the violations; (3) the 
defendant’s financial worth; (4) whether the defendant concealed his 
trading; (5) what other penalties arise as the result of the defendant’s 
conduct; and (6) whether the defendant is employed in the securities 
industry.137
The court assessed the above factors and ultimately acted 
within its discretion to impose a civil penalty on the defendant, “not 
only to punish him but to serve as a deterrent on insider trading 
generally.”138
The other common rationale invoked in sentencing insider 
trading offenders is the supposed need to protect the integrity of and 
investor confidence in the market. For example, in United States v. 
Goffer,139 the United States Court of Appeals (Second Circuit) stated 
that “[i]n light of the magnitude of his insider trading, which had 
major deleterious effects on the market, Drimal was no small-time 
criminal.”140
Similarly in United States v. Kurland, the Court stated:
136. United States v. Gupta, 904 F. Supp. 2d 349, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
137. SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 32 (1st Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
138. Id. at 33.
139. United States v. Goffer, 721 F.3d 113 (2nd Cir. 2013).
140. Id. at 132.
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Mr. Kurland’s actions, stemming from a recognized leader of the industry, 
compromised the financial market’s integrity at a time of financial crises 
and widespread concern about corruption, rampant recklessness, and 
arrogant greed at the highest levels of the industry, a culture of oblivion to 
the meaning of reasonable limits that contributed significantly to bring 
about the worst economic collapse in the country since the Great 
Depression.141
We now consider United States sentencing law and practice in 
relation to market manipulation offenses.
D. Sentencing Law in the United States: Market Manipulation 
Offenses 
While the concept of market manipulation or abuse is not 
expressly or statutorily defined in the United States, it is commonly 
known as an attempt to artificially raise or lower the price of stock 
on any national securities or commodities exchange, or in the over-
the-counter marketplace, i.e., a deliberate interference with the open 
market.142
In the United States, there has been legislation to combat 
offenders who manipulate the market. The Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 prohibits the making of corporate misstatements that will 
lead to the defrauding of innocent investors.143 As we have seen, this 
Act expressly prohibits market manipulation and prohibits a person 
from willingly creating misleading or false appearances in securities 
listed on a stock exchange.144 Further, this Act prohibits a person 
from directly or indirectly using deceptive devices to purchase or sell 
any listed securities to the detriment of investors.145
Where an offender commits a market manipulation offense, 
there are a variety of penalties available, including criminal, civil, 
and administrative sanctions.146 Market manipulation offenders are 
subject to the general sentencing principles in the United States. 
However, there are several sentencing factors that apply more 
141. United States v. Kurland, 718 F. Supp. 2d 316, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
142. Rick Wayman, The Short and Distort: Stock Manipulation in a Bear 
Market, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 30, 2016, 5:02 PM), http://www.investopedia. 
com/articles/analyst/030102.asp [https://perma.cc/7DX9-BL5M]. 
143. Howard Chitimira, Overview of the Federal Prohibition on Market 
Abuse in the United States of America, 5 MEDITERRANEAN J. SOC. SCI. 119, 126 
(2014). 
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 129. 
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commonly for someone who commits a market manipulation 
offense. As previously discussed, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
provide the framework for the sentencing of market manipulation 
offenders. As compared to white-collar crime in general, there are 
some particular considerations that apply to market manipulation 
offenses. 
Since market manipulation involves the deliberate interference 
with the market, it follows that the offender committed the offense 
knowingly. Thus, the court will focus more heavily on factors such 
as where the offender knowingly violates market manipulation 
provisions, or where an offender willfully or intentionally engages in 
prohibited trade practices.147 Other sentencing factors include 
whether the offender willfully or recklessly aided, abetted, 
counseled, commanded, or induced another person to commit market 
abuse practices.148 Those offenders who willfully aid others typically 
constitute an aggravating factor at sentencing. 
In the United States, there have been several large, highly 
publicized cases involving market manipulation. The most widely 
known case involves the Enron scandal that began in late 2001.149
Enron was a company located in Texas that primarily marketed 
electricity and natural gas and delivered energy and other physical 
commodities. Enron was once ranked the sixth largest energy 
company in the world, until it was revealed that most of the top 
executives were tried for fraud after a formal investigation revealed 
that Enron’s earnings had been overstated by several hundred million 
dollars.150 Top executives were manipulating the market by 
misrepresenting earnings reports while continuing to enjoy the 
revenues provided by the investors who were not made aware of the 
true financial condition of Enron.151 The funds being stolen from the 
company resulted in bankruptcy for Enron. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the U.S. Department of Justice 
launched a formal investigation into Enron and many of the top 
executives of the company were arrested.
The two most notable executives from the Enron scandal were 
punished the most severely. Kenneth Lay was CEO of Enron from 
147. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a) (amended Aug. 10, 2012).
148. See id. §§ 32(a), 24. 
149. See In re Enron Corp. Sec. v. Enron Corp., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. 
Tex. 2002). 
150. Enron Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 17, 2016, 5:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2013/07/02/us/enron-fast-facts/ [https://perma.cc/LDD2-QE55]. 
151. See id.
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1985 to 2000, and then Jeffrey Skilling took over for a year.152
Skilling resigned as CEO in August 2001, and Lay was reinstated as 
CEO again.153 Skilling was indicted on nineteen counts of fraud and 
conspiracy, while Lay was indicted on eleven counts.154 The jury in 
the Enron case found Jeffrey Skilling and Kenneth Lay guilty of 
conspiracy and fraud. Approximately two months after the verdict, 
Kenneth Lay died and did not receive a sentence before his death.155
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas 
sentenced Skilling to 292 months of imprisonment (or 24 years and 
4 months) and three years of supervised release, and assessed $45 
million in restitution.156 He then appealed his conviction and, in 
2013, a federal judge reduced his sentence by more than ten years.157
Another widely known market manipulation case in the United 
States involved the company WorldCom. The company was 
recording its operating expenses as investments and exaggerated 
profits in 2001 by inflating assets.158 WorldCom was ultimately 
caught for stock market manipulation by its own internal auditing 
department early in 2002.159 WorldCom’s CFO Scott Sullivan and 
CEO Bernard Ebbers were indicted on charges of fraud. CFO 
Sullivan entered a guilty plea in exchange for a lighter sentence and 
received only five years in prison.160 However, CEO Ebbers was 
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. Lay was indicted for one count of conspiracy to commit security and 
wire fraud, two counts of wire fraud for misleading statements at employee 
meetings, four counts of securities fraud for false statements in presentation to 
securities analysts, one count of bank fraud, and three counts of making false 
statements to banks. Id.
155. Id.
156. United States v. Skilling, 638 F.3d 480, 481 (5th Cir. 2011). 
157. Aaron Smith, Ex-Enron CEO Skilling has 10 years Lopped off Sentence,
CNN MONEY (June 21, 2013, 5:02 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/21/news/ 
companies/skilling-enron-resentencing/ [https://perma.cc/RTT5-UMS4].
158. Abby Higgs, Four Notorious Cases of Stock Manipulation, MONEY 
MORNING (July 8, 2015), http://moneymorning.com/2015/07/08/four-notorious-cases-of-
stock-market-manipulation/?gateType=hostage [https://perma.cc/W7L2-DNNC].
159. Id.
160. Jennifer Bayot & Roben Farzad, Former WorldCom Executive 
Sentenced to 5 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2005), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2005/08/11/business/former-worldcom-executive-sentenced-to-5-years-in-prison. 
html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/FZS9-Z8WR]. 
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sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for his role in “orchestrating 
the biggest corporate fraud in the nation’s history.”161
Adelphia Communications is another highly publicized market 
manipulation case. Prior to the scandal, Adelphia was one of the 
nation’s largest cable TV companies. John Rigas was the founder 
and owner of Adelphia, who was the driving force behind the 
eventual scandal. John Rigas and other family members were found 
to have been “regularly conducting their business activities with the 
sole purpose of benefitting themselves at the expense of Adelphia 
and borrowed company funds that either directly or indirectly, 
unjustly enriched the Rigas family.”162 The Rigases used company 
jets for private trips, borrowed billions of dollars for their closely 
held companies, and used $252 million of company funds to meet 
margin calls on their private stock.163
The New York Times noted that this scandal is distinguishable
from virtually every other market manipulation case for one 
reason—the Rigases didn’t sell their stock.”164 It added, “[t]he 
evidence suggests less that they intended to defraud than that they 
intended to hide inconvenient facts until they could be righted. This 
is also, of course, against the law; it’s just a more tragic crime than 
ordinary looting.”165 Ultimately, owner John Rigas was sentenced to 
fifteen years and his son Timothy Rigas was sentenced to twenty 
years in prison for multiple charges of securities fraud, conspiracy to 
commit bank fraud, and bank fraud.166
Another highly publicized, well-known market manipulation/ 
stock fraud scandal involved Charles E. Johnson, founder and CEO 
of now-defunct PurchasePro Incorporated. Johnson was the 
ringleader of a scheme to falsely inflate PurchasePro’s revenue in the 
161. Krysten Crawford, Ebbers Gets 25 Years, CNN MONEY (Sept. 23, 2005, 
7:42 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/07/13/news/newsmakers/ebbers_sentence/ 
[https://perma.cc/PRE9-A6PQ]. 
162. Robert Frank & Jerry Markon, Adelphia Officials Are Arrested, 
Charged with ‘Massive’ Fraud, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2002, 12:01 AM) (quotations 
omitted), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1027516262583067680 [https://perma.cc/ 
7PA6-FX75].
163. Id.
164. Roger Lowenstein, The Company They Kept, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/01/magazine/the-company-they-kept.html? 
pagewanted=1&pagewanted=print [https://perma.cc/5RFD-W5Z8]. 
165. Id.
166. Martha Waggoner, Adelphia’s Rigases Report to Prison, FOX NEWS
(Aug. 13, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2007Aug13/ 0,4675, 
AdelphiaFraud,00.html [https://perma.cc/2XCH-WUSY].
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first quarter of 2001.167 Seven people were convicted in this 
investigation, “which also exposed improper accounting practices at 
America Online [(AOL)], which had been PurchasePro’s business 
partner” at the time.168 Johnson’s scheme included inflating the 
company’s revenue to meet the expectations of Wall Street, 
falsifying and backdating contracts, and entering into secret side 
deals with AOL.169 Johnson was convicted of stock fraud, witness 
tampering, and obstruction of justice.170 Prosecutors recommended 
Johnson serve between 16 and 17.5 years in jail.171 However, U.S. 
District Judge Liam O’Grady ruled that because Johnson’s crimes 
occurred more than seven years prior, Johnson should be sentenced 
under older federal guidelines, which called for a lesser sentence.172
Johnson was ultimately sentenced to 9 years in prison, which was 
much less than what had been recommended.173
The above discussion of market manipulation cases sets out 
some examples of the most serious offenses of this nature in order to 
textualize the nature of the offending. More comprehensively, the 
post-2000 market manipulation cases that attracted the heaviest 
penalties are set out in the following table:
Case Name and Court Date of 
Sentence
Sentence (length of 
imprisonment)
1. U.S. v. Hawatmeh
[Unreported, U.S. 
District Court in 
Tacoma]
June 5, 2015 5 years (Hawatmeh)
3 years (Mrowca)
2. U.S. v. Madoff
[Unreported, U.S. 
District Court, 
S.D.N.Y]
June 29, 2009 150 years
167. Matthew Barakat, Ex-Tech Billionaire Gets 9 Years for Stock Fraud,
USA TODAY (Nov. 14, 2008, 5:58 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/ 
economy/2008-11-14-3869992001_x.htm [https://perma.cc/35DR-V66Y]. 
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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3. U.S. v. Johnson
[Unreported, U.S. 
District Court, E.D. 
Va.] 
November 14, 
2008
9 years
4. U.S. v. Israel
[Unreported, U.S. 
District Court, 
S.D.N.Y.]
April 14, 2008 20 years
5. U.S. v. Scrushy
(HealthSouth scandal)
[Unreported, U.S. 
District Court, M.D. 
Ala.] 
June 28, 2007 6 years and 10 
months
6. U.S. v. Skilling
(Enron scandal) 
[Unreported, U.S. 
District Court for the 
S.D. Tex.] 
October 23, 
2006
24 years and 4 
months 
7. People v. Kozlowski,
846 N.Y.S. 2d 44 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2007) People 
v. Swartz and People v. 
Kozlowski (Tyco 
scandal)
[Unreported, New York 
State Supreme Court]
September 19, 
2005
8-1/3 to 25 years
8. U.S. v. Ebbers, 458 
F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006)
July 13, 2005 25 years
9. U.S. v. Rigas, No. 02 
Cr. 1236 (LBS), 2008 
WL 2544654 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 24, 2008)
June 27, 2005 12 years (John 
Rigas) and 17 years 
(Timothy Rigas)
10. U.S. v. Aziz-
Golshani
[Unreported, U.S. 
District Court, C.D. 
Cal.]
January 22, 
2001
15 months
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As with insider trading, two key considerations that the courts 
invoke to justify harsh penalties for insider trading offenses are
general deterrence and the damage to the integrity or confidence in 
the markets.174
In United States v. Castaldi, “defendant Frank Castaldi made 
an entire career out of a Ponzi scheme” and was convicted, upon a 
guilty plea, of mail fraud and corruptly impeding the IRS.175 In 
determining his sentence, the court addressed deterrence, both 
specific and general, and held that a Guideline sentence would not be 
adequate as a deterrent to this crime.176 The court considered all the 
mitigating factors that the defense had set forth in its 
memorandum.177 “The sentence was the longest possible under the 
plea agreement: maximum consecutive sentences for a total of 276 
months (twenty-three years) in prison.”178
Likewise, in United States v. Martin, the court heavily 
considered general deterrence as a factor in its holding.179 In the 
lower district court, the defendant pled guilty to conspiring to 
commit securities and mail fraud.180 The district court made a 
substantial departure (23 levels) from the sentencing guidelines and 
imposed probation.181 The government appealed the extent of the 
departure and the case was vacated and remanded. On remand, the 
district court imposed a sentence of seven days.182 The government 
again appealed. The Eleventh Circuit weighed in on deterrence: 
“[T]he 7-day sentence imposed by the district court utterly fails to 
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct [b]ecause economic 
and fraud-based crimes are ‘more rational, cool, and calculated than 
sudden crimes of passion or opportunity,’ these crimes are ‘prime 
candidate[s] for general deterrence.’”183 The view was taken that 
white-collar crime defendants will typically weigh financial gain and 
risk of loss, and thus, white-collar crime can be affected and reduced 
with serious punishment through deterrence.184 Accordingly, the 
174. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 299, 325 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
175. 743 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 2014). 
176. Id. at 594.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 594-95.
179. 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006).
180. Id. at 1229. 
181. Id. at 1233. 
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1240 (citations omitted).
184. See id.
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Eleventh Circuit vacated Martin’s sentence and remanded the case 
for resentencing in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Booker.185
In SEC v. Lorin, the court expressly raised the concept of 
general deterrence: 
Disgorgement is an equitable remedy that does not compensate investors 
but rather is “designed to deprive a wrongdoer of his unjust enrichment 
and to deter others from violating the securities laws.” In view of the fact 
that the Court has found Capital Shares, Caito, and Ruggiero to have 
violated Sections 17(a) of the Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act, disgorgement is an appropriate remedy to preclude the 
unjust enrichment of these defendants, as well as to serve both specific 
and general deterrence purposes.186
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Reddy v. Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission noted that the offender’s conduct was 
“serious, repetitive, and affected the integrity of the market. . . . and 
such misconduct, when detected, must be heavily punished if 
deterrence is to be achieved.”187 The court went on to state that the 
amount of penalties per violation must have a rational relationship to 
the offense and in offenses of this type the integrity of the market is 
an important consideration. The court stated: 
It is certainly reasonable to measure the gravity of the violations by “the 
betrayal of public interest” and by the need to deter threats to the integrity 
of the markets, and “the calculation of civil money penalties does not lend 
itself to simple formulaic solutions” . . . we conclude that the civil 
monetary penalties here were rationally related to the misconduct.188
Further, the Supreme Court has adopted a “presumption of 
reliance” and the Court assumes that buyers and sellers rely not just 
on the market price, but also on the integrity of that price.189 Notably, 
this is an assumption only and, as we discuss below, is not validated 
by empirical evidence. 
185. Id.
186. SEC v. Lorin, 877 F. Supp. 192, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting SEC v. 
First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
187. Reddy v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 191 F.3d 109, 127 (2d 
Cir. 1999). 
188. Id. at 128 (quoting In re Grossfeld, 1996 WL 709219, at *12 (C.F.T.C. 
1996)).
189. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245-47 (1988). 
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E. Sentencing Law in Australia: An Overview 
Sentencing law differs in each Australian jurisdiction (the six 
states, the Northern Territory, the Australian Capital Territory, and 
the federal jurisdiction).190 However, there is considerable 
convergence in relation to a number of key areas.191 All Australian 
jurisdictions pursue the same fundamental objectives of sentencing, 
in the form of incapacitation (also referred to as community 
protection), general deterrence, specific deterrence, rehabilitation, 
and retribution192—as is the situation in the United States. 
Sentencing judges in Australia have wide discretion regarding 
choice of penalty.193 Fixed penalties for serious offenses in Australia 
are rare.194 The reasoning process that judges undertake in making 
sentencing decisions is known as the “instinctive synthesis,” 
pursuant to which sentencers make a decision regarding all of the 
considerations that are relevant to sentencing and then give due 
weight to each of them (and, in the process, incorporate 
considerations that incline to a heavier penalty and offset against the 
factors that favor a lesser penalty) and then set a precise penalty.195
“The hallmark of this process is that it does not require (nor permit) 
judges to set out with any particularity the weight (in mathematical 
terms) accorded to any particular consideration.”196 “Under this 
model, courts can impose a sentence within an ‘available range’ of 
penalties.”197 The spectrum of this range is not clearly defined.
A defining aspect of Australian sentencing law is the large 
number of considerations (more than 200) that can either mitigate or 
aggravate a penalty.198 There are four categories of mitigating 
190. Mirko Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in 
Sentencing: Why Less Is More When It Comes to Punishing Criminals, 62 BUFF. L.
REV. 1159, 1181 (2014).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1191.
193. Id. at 1181-82.
194. Id. at 1182.
195. Id.
196. Mirko Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness: The 
Need to Abolish the Stain That Is the Instinctive Synthesis, 38 U. NEW S. WALES L.J.
76, 79-80 (2015).
197. Id. at 80. 
198. Compare JOANNA SHAPLAND, BETWEEN CONVICTION AND SENTENCE:
THE PROCESS OF MITIGATION 55 (1981) (identifying 229 factors), with LA TROBE 
UNIV., GUILTY, YOUR WORSHIP: A STUDY OF VICTORIA’S MAGISTRATES’ COURTS 62
(1980) (identifying 292 relevant sentencing factors).
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factors.199 The first are those relating to the offender’s response to a 
charge and include pleading guilty200 and remorse.201 The second 
category consists of factors that relate to the circumstances of the 
offense and which contribute to, and to some extent explain, the 
offending. These include mental impairment202 and provocation.203
The third category relates to matters that are personal to the offender, 
such as youth204 and good prospects of rehabilitation.205 The impact 
of the sanction is the fourth broad type of mitigating factor, and 
includes considerations such as onerous prison conditions206 and 
public opprobrium.207 Additionally, there are also a large number of 
aggravating factors, including prior criminal record, offending 
committed while on bail,208 and breach of trust.209
F. Sentencing Law in Australia: Insider Trading Offenses 
Within this rubric, sentencing principles relating to white-collar 
crime are largely open-ended, but in practice there are a number of 
widely accepted and observed rules. White-collar offenses are 
199. See VICTORIA SENTENCING COMM., SENTENCING: REPORT OF THE 
VICTORIAN SENTENCING COMMITTEE 359-60 (1988).
200. See Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339 (Austl.).
201. See R v Whyte (2004) 7 VR 397 (Austl.), 2004 WL 293334, at *6; 
Barbaro v The Queen [2012] VSCA 288 (Austl.), 2012 WL 6838969, at *9; Phillips 
v The Queen (2012) 222 A Crim R 149, 150 (Austl.).
202. See R v Tsiaras (1996) 1 VR 398, 1995 AustLII, at *3, 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VicRp/1996/26.html [https://perma.cc/56GW-
Z7BF]; see also Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120, 121 (Austl.); R v 
Verdins (2007) 169 A Crim R 581, 581 (Austl.).
203. Va v The Queen [2011] VSCA 426 (Austl.), 2011 WL 6243369, at *6. 
204. See R v Neilson [2011] QCA 369 (Austl.), 2011 WL 6396560, at *5; R 
v Kuzmanovski [2012] QCA 19 (Austl.), 2012 WL 695716, at *5-6.
205. See R v Osenkowski (1982) 30 SASR 212, 217; R v Skilbeck [2010] 
SASCFC 35 (Austl.), 2010 WL 3996191, at *6; Elyard v The Queen [2006] 
NSWCCA 43 (Austl.), 2006 WL 565308, at *6.
206. W. Austl. v O’Kane [2011] WASCA 24 (Austl.), 2011 WL 2207597, at 
*12; R v Puc [2008] VSCA 159 (Austl.), 2007 WL 5446433, at *6; Tognolini v The 
Queen [2012] VSCA 311 (Austl.), 2012 WL 6436981, at *10. 
207. Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267, 279 (Austl.).
208. R v Gray [1977] VR 27 (Austl.); R v Basso (1999) 108 A Crim R 392 
(Austl.), 1999 WL 33123270, at *5; R v AD (2008) 191 A Crim R 409, 415 (NSW).
209. DPP (Vic) v. Truong [2004] VSCA 172 (Austl.), 2004 WL 2212522, at 
*2; A-G (Tas) v Saunders [2000] TASSC 22 (Austl.), 2000 WL 1241368, at *3; R v 
Hill [1999] TASSC 29 (Austl.); R v Ottobrino [1999] WASCA 207 (Austl.), 1999 
WL 33122413, at *4; R v Black [2002] WASCA 26 (Austl.), 2002 WL 241499, at 
*6-7.
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generally regarded as often being committed for greed;210 thus, a 
paramount consideration in sentencing is the amount of money 
involved.211 Other important considerations are the level of 
sophistication and planning of the offense212 and whether or not a 
breach of trust occurred.213 Offenses committed over a long period of 
time are normally considered to be more serious.214
The cardinal sentencing consideration regarding white-collar 
offenses is general deterrence.215 This is especially the situation in 
relation to insider trading offenses. In relation to such offenses, 
another key consideration is the supposed damage that insider 
trading offenses do to the market. In R v Bateson, Judge Buddin 
provided an extensive analysis of the principles guiding sentences for 
insider trading offenses. In the passage below, His Honour 
emphasizes the importance of general deterrence and damage to the 
market system. In terms of the general principles, His Honour stated: 
The principles which are applicable to sentencing for offences of insider 
trading were conveniently stated in R v Rivkin [2002] NSWSC 1182; 
(2003) 198 ALR 400, in which Whealy J, as His Honour then was, said 
that:
“[T]he element of general deterrence is important in white collar crimes. It 
is of course, an important part of the sentencing process in all crimes. It is 
however, an especially important matter in crimes such as the present 
210. See, e.g., DPP v. Bulfin [1998] VSC 261 (Austl.); Gianello v. The 
Queen [2015] VSCA 205, ¶ 20 (Austl.); DPP (C’th) v. Gregory [2011] VSCA 145, 
¶ 58 (Austl.).
211. Arie Freiberg, Sentencing White-Collar Criminals 9, Paper Presented at 
the Fraud Prevention and Control Conference, AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY (Aug. 
24, 2000), http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/conferences/fraud/freiberg.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KDX6-KLNP]; see also Hoy v The Queen [2012] VSCA 49 
(Austl.), 2012 WL 900653, at *4.
212. R v Coukoulis (2003) 138 A Crim R 520, 535 (Austl.); R v Webber
(2000) 114 A Crim R 381 (Austl.), 2000 WL 1244822, at *2; R v Cameron (1993) 
171 LSJS 305.
213. DPP v Penny [2012] VSCA 203 (Austl.); Porcaro v The Queen [2015] 
VSCA 244 (Austl.). 
214. R v Ralphs [2004] VSCA 33 (Austrl.), 2004 WL 598909, at *2, *4 
(discussing the fraud by a law clerk over a nine-year period); R v Grossi (2008) 183 
A Crim R 15, 24 (Austrl.) (discussing the theft from employer lasting six years); R v 
Galletta [2007] VSCA 177 (Austl.), 2007 WL 2452719, at *1 (discussing the theft 
from employer for nine years).
215. DPP (NSW) v Hamman, No. 60388, 1998 NSW LEXIS 2509, at *44 (1 
Dec. 1998) (Austl.); see also DPP (Cth) v Rowson [2007] VSCA 176 (Austl.), 2007 
WL 2463427, at *5; R v Bromley (2010) 79 ATR 692, 697 (Austl.); R v Nicholson 
[2004] QCA 393 (Austl.), 2004 WL 2378443, at *4; R v Wheatley (2007) 67 ATR 
531, 531 (Austl.).
1058 Michigan State Law Review 2016
because of the need to mark out plainly to others who might be minded to 
breach their professional or related obligations that such conduct will 
generally merit, in appropriate cases, condign punishment.
An important reason why this is so relates to the often remarked difficulty 
in detecting and investigating white collar crime. Insider trading is 
particularly hard to detect. It may often go unnoticed but where it occurs it 
has the capacity to undermine to a serious degree the integrity of the 
market in public securities. It has the additional capacity to diminish 
public confidence not only so far as investors are concerned but the 
general public as well. Moreover, this diminution in confidence may occur 
subtly and is not confined to the circumstances where a substantial insider 
trading transaction has taken place. There is a capacity to undermine and 
diminish public confidence in the market even where the offence may be 
shown as one which in some respects occupies a lower level of 
seriousness. This is likely to be particularly so in the case of an offender 
who occupies a substantial position as a trader and advisor in the market.” 
. . . .
The damage caused by insider trading was described by the Court of 
Criminal Appeal in R v Rivkin [2004] NSWCCA 7; (2004) 184 FLR 365 
in the following terms:
“Nor is it correct to describe the offence . . . as ‘victimless’. The victim of 
any such offence is the investing community at large, the injury being that 
related to the loss of confidence in the efficacy and integrity of the market 
in public securities.” 
In R v Firns (2001) 51 NSWLR 548; [2001] NSWCCA 191 Mason P 
observed that:
“On this approach, equality of access to the relevant market is the critical 
factor. Under this theory, restrictions on insider trading are designed to 
ensure that the market operates fairly, with all participants having equal 
access to relevant information. The playing field is to be levelled.”
. . . .
In [Director of Public Prosecutions] v O’Reilly [2010] VSC 138, T 
Forrest J said that:
“[I]n insider trading cases I consider there are at least two victims; the 
seller or sellers of the stock at the lower price and the public, whose 
confidence in the integrity of the market must be diminished. The impact 
upon public confidence in the market is an important factor. The securities 
markets could not survive and flourish without the confidence of those 
who elect to invest in it.”216
216. R v Bateson [2011] NSWSC 643 (Austl.), 2011 WL 5436306, at *24-
26; see R v Richard [2011] NSWSC 866 (Austl.) (discussing where the offender was 
sentenced for a violation of §§ 1041G(1) and 1041E(1) of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth), relating to sums in excess of $26 million).
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In Hartman v Director of Public Prosecution (Cth),217 the court 
allowed an offender’s appeal against his sentence—essentially on the 
basis of his mental illness—for a number of insider trading offenses 
(contrary to §§ 1043A(1), 1043A(2), and 1311(1) of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)). In doing so, the court emphasized the 
importance of general deterrence in relation to such offenses. The 
court also held that trading in off-market derivatives is no less 
serious because of the damage to the institutional integrity of the 
markets. The court stated:
It needs to be remembered that insider trading not only has the capacity to 
undermine the integrity of the market, it also has the potential to 
undermine aspects of confidence in the commercial world generally.218
The supposed harm caused to the markets by insider trading is 
more recently noted in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v 
Couper, where the court stated:
As the Honourable Justice McClellan, speaking extra-judicially, said:
“When assessing the seriousness of a crime involving violence to an 
individual, the extent of the harm occasioned to the victim is a significant 
matter. The sentence may vary depending upon the nature and extent of 
the injuries inflicted on the victim. White-collar crime also impacts upon 
victims, sometimes many, but usually lacks any physical violence. 
Although mostly confined to a loss of money, that loss may have a 
devastating consequence for the wellbeing of the individual. Identifying 
and weighing the harm may prove difficult. When a market is 
manipulated, the loss to a particular individual may be impossible to 
identify.
. . . .
Both white-collar and financial crime have the capacity to do great harm 
to many members of the community. Apart from financial loss the 
psychological harm to an individual in the form of stress and anxiety may 
be significant. By its nature, white-collar or financial crime may be hard to 
discover, and the victims’ losses may be difficult to ascertain and quantify. 
The offender may have a multitude of victims. The crime may affect the 
Australian economic ‘brand’ and its desirability as a place to invest. This 
may be contrasted with offences involving property damage, larceny or 
robbery where the damage is likely to be confined to an individual victim 
or a small group of victims. The harm inflicted by insider trading and 
other market-related offences will be greater both in absolute terms and in 
respect of the number of victims than many other white-collar crimes and 
the more common offences. In its ‘rawest form, insider trading dislocates 
the market. It upsets overseas investors’. Similarly, ‘the vast majority of 
shareholders suffer. They miss out on value . . .’. Victims of insider 
217. [2011] NSWCCA 261 (Austl.), 2011 WL 6318677, at *3.
218. Id. at *21. 
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trading include ‘“Mums and Dads”, investors, small traders, and those 
who do not have the information and trade in that state of ignorance’. 
Indeed, it is generally the ‘people on the outer ring of the market’, such as 
retirees and the like, who are particularly disadvantaged.”219
G. Insider Trading in Australia: Examples of Heavy Penalties 
The culmination of the application of the above principles to 
the sentencing of insider trading offenders is generally severe 
penalties. However, the length of prison terms is typically shorter 
than in the United States. Set out below are the nine highest 
sentences for insider trading offenses in Australia post-2000:220
Case Name and Court Date of Sentence Sentence (length of 
imprisonment)
1. R v Curtis [2016] 
NSW 866
June 24, 2016 2 years
2. Regina v Xiao
[2016] NSWSC 240 
March 11, 2016 8 years, 3 months
3. DPP (Cth) v Hill
[2015] VSC 86
March 17, 2015 Hill: 2 years
Kamay: 7 years
4. R v Zhu [2013] 
NSWSC 127
February 15, 
2013
1 year, 3 months
5. R v Hartman
[2010] NSWSC 1422
December 2, 
2010
4.5 years
6. R v Mckay [2007] 
NSWSC 275
March 30, 2007 15 months of prison 
to be served by 
periodic detention
7. R v Frawley [2005] 
NSWSC 585
June 24, 2005 2 years, 6 month 
prison via periodic 
detention
8. R v Rivkin [2003] 
NSWSC 447
May 29, 2003 9 months of prison 
via periodic detention
9. R v Hannes [2002] 
NSWSC 1182
December 13, 
2002
2 years and two 
months of prison
219. [2013] VSCA 72 (Austl.), 2013 WL 1411735, at *16-17; see also R v 
Glynatsis [2013] NSWCCA 131 (Austl.), 2013 WL 2639304, at *14 (underlining the 
seriousness of insider trading offenses).
220. There are nine instead of ten, given that the authors could only locate 
nine such cases that resulted in the imposition of prison terms.
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H. Sentencing Law in Australia: Market Manipulation Offenses 
The principles regarding market manipulation offenses in 
Australia are similar to those relating to insider trading offenses, with 
general deterrence and the supposed damage to the integrity of the 
market being the two most important sentencing considerations. In R
v Chan the court stated, in relation to market manipulation offending, 
that: 
The aspect of general deterrence must play a significant role in this 
sentencing exercise. . . . I consider that it is only by the imposition of such 
a sentence that others considering manipulating the market in some way 
will pause to think about the potential consequences of their actions.221
In similar vein, in R v Jacobson (Sentence) the court 
emphasized the need for general deterrence for market manipulation 
offenders and the reason for this approach. The court stated: 
In cases such as this, the courts have emphasised that the principles of 
general deterrence and denunciation must be given significant weight. It is 
the common experience of the courts that offences, such as those for 
which you have been convicted—falling under the general rubric of 
“white collar” offences—are ordinarily committed by persons who have 
hitherto been of good character and reputation. Such offences are difficult 
to detect and to prove. Unless the courts adopt a firm approach in the 
imposition of sentences for such offences, those persons, who are minded 
to commit such offences, will consider that the risks in doing so are 
outweighed by the potential benefits, which may accrue from involvement 
in such offences. For those reasons, it has been emphasised by the courts 
that the considerations of denunciation and general deterrence must take 
precedence, and be given significantly more weight, than the mitigatory 
factors, to which I have already referred, such as your good character and 
your health issues.222
In R v Chan, the court emphasized the importance of the 
integrity of the market in relation to market manipulation offenses. It 
stated: 
Section 780A of the Corporations Act states the objects of Ch 7 (which 
includes [§] 1041A). One is to ensure fair, orderly and transparent markets 
for financial products. If the markets lack integrity, public confidence in 
them is necessarily eroded. The object of [§] 1041A is to protect the 
securities market from “artificial or managed manipulation”. Your conduct 
in facilitating the efforts of Hal and Ian Christiansen to artificially inflate 
221. (2010) 79 ACSR 189 (Austl.); see also R v Moylan [2014] NSWSC 944 
(Austl.).
222. R v Jacobson [2014] VSC 592 (Austl.), 2014 WL 6693859, at *10; see 
also R v Dulhunty [2015] NSWSC 1747 (Austl.), 2015 WL 7687227, at *91; R v 
Heath [2015] NSWDC 282 (Austl.), 2015 WL 7871583, at *11.
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the closing price of Bill Express securities therefore must be viewed 
seriously. The impact of your conduct is not felt merely by those tempted 
to purchase Bill Express shares in an artificial market or the banks who 
otherwise would be entitled to a margin call from exposed shareholders; it 
is felt by the entire securities market, a market that you understood 
intimately.223
The same sentiment was expressed in R v Jacobson (Sentence),
but with even more clarity: 
The offences, for which you have been convicted, are serious. The express 
objective of [§] 1041A of the Corporations Act is to promote a fair, 
orderly and transparent market for registered securities. As part of that 
objective, [§] 1041A is directed to ensuring that the market price for 
registered securities truly reflects the genuine interaction of the forces of 
supply and demand for those securities on a free market. The conduct, in 
which you indulged, and to which you were a party, was calculated to 
undermine that objective. In that way, your conduct had the capacity to 
erode the integrity of, and public confidence in, the securities market, and 
thereby to cause damage to members of the community, who have 
invested their savings in that market.224
The culmination of the application of the above principles to 
the sentencing of insider trading offenders is generally severe 
penalties—although again not as severe as in the United States. Set 
out below are the seven highest sentences for market manipulation 
offenses in Australia post-2000:225
Case Name and 
Court
Date of Sentence Sentence (length of 
imprisonment)
1. Nigel Derek 
Heath v R 
[2016] NSWCCA 
24
February 25, 2016 3 months of prison + 15 
months to be served by 
way of recognizance 
order to be of good 
behavior
223. R v Chan (2010) 79 ACSR 189 (Austl.).
224. [2014] VSC 592 (Austl.), 2014 WL 6693859, at *6; see also R v 
Dulhunty [2015] NSWSC 1747 (Austl.), 2015 WL 7687227, at *4; R v Heath [2015] 
NSWDC 282 (Austl.), 2015 WL 7871583, at *11; Heath v The Queen [2015] 
NSWCCA 24 (Austl.), 2016 WL 739533, at *5.
225. There are seven instead of ten, given that the authors could only locate 
seven such cases that resulted in the imposition of prison terms.
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2. R v Dulhunty;
R v PR
[2015] NSWSC 
1747
November 30, 2015 Dulhunty: 6 months of 
prison + 1 year to be 
served by way of 
recognizance order to 
be of good behavior
PR: 6 months of prison 
+ 1 year to be served by 
way of recognizance 
order to be of good 
behavior
3. R v Heath
[2015] NSWDC 
282
September 25, 
2015
9 months of prison + 18 
months to be served by 
way of recognizance 
order to be of good 
behavior
4. R v Jacobson
[2014] VSC 592
November 28, 2014 1 year of prison + 20 
months to be served by 
way of recognizance 
order to be of good 
behavior
5. R v Moylan
[2014] NSWSC 
944
July 25, 2014 1 year and 8 months of 
prison + 2 years of 
recognizance order to 
be of good behavior
6. R v Chan
[2010] VSC 312
July 13, 2010 20 months of 
recognizance order to 
be of good behavior
7. R v Austin
[2001] NSWSC 
484
June 13, 2001 3 years of recognizance 
order to be of good 
behavior
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III. DISCUSSION OF THE KEY RATIONALES FOR HARSH SENTENCES 
FOR INSIDER TRADING AND MARKET MANIPULATION OFFENSES 
As we have seen, in pragmatic terms the two key rationales that 
are advanced for imposing severe punishment on insider trading and 
market manipulation offenders are general deterrence and the 
supposed harm their actions cause to the stock market. A closer 
analysis of these rationales establishes that none of them are 
defensible—they are all debunked by an empirical analysis. We now 
elaborate on these observations, starting with general deterrence. 
A. The Failure of Marginal General Deterrence 
General deterrence seeks to dissuade potential offenders with 
the threat of anticipated punishment from committing similar 
offenses by illustrating the harsh consequences of offending.226 There 
are two forms of general deterrence. Marginal general deterrence is 
the view that severe penalties reduce the incidence of crime. It 
contends that imposing increasingly harsh penalties will reduce 
crime.227 Absolute general deterrence is the more modest claim. It 
concerns the threshold question of whether there is any connection 
between criminal sanctions, of whatever nature, and the incidence of 
criminal conduct.228 Absolute general deterrence does not require or 
support the imposition of harsh sanctions.229 In order for it to be 
effective, any sanction which people find unpleasant (such as a fine) 
is sufficient. The evidence suggests that marginal deterrence is a 
flawed theory, while absolute general deterrence does work.230 There
is a large body of literature devoted to this issue. The following is a 
summary of the major findings.231
Marginal general deterrence seems to be flawed in relation to 
all penalty types. There has been a considerable degree of debate 
226. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL 
THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 72 (Sanford H. Kadish et al. eds., 1973). 
227. See Bagaric, From Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing, supra 
note 29, at 382.
228. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 226, at 14.
229. See Bagaric, From Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing, supra 
note 29, at 382. 
230. Id. at 394. 
231. The findings and discussion regarding general deterrence are discussed 
in greater detail and derived from Bagaric, From Arbitrariness to Coherency in 
Sentencing, supra note 29.
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regarding the efficacy of capital punishment to deter crime.232
However, the weight of evidence and informed sentiment233 suggests 
that there is no firm basis for believing that it even reduces crime. 
The most wide-ranging recent analysis of the impact of the death 
penalty on crime is by the National Research Council of the National 
Academies, which was released in 2012. The report concluded:
The committee concludes that research to date on the effect of capital 
punishment on homicide is not informative about whether capital 
punishment decreases, increases, or has no effect on homicide rates.
Therefore, the committee recommends that these studies not be used to 
inform deliberations requiring judgments about the effect of the death 
penalty on homicide. Consequently, claims that research demonstrates that 
capital punishment decreases or increases the homicide rate by a specified
amount or has no effect on the homicide rate should not influence policy 
judgments about capital punishment.234
The above conclusions are based on crime data in general. 
They are not focused on white-collar offending. This is because of 
the dearth of empirical research that has been undertaken on this 
specific issue. Yet, it is possible, with some caveats, to extrapolate 
the results of the general observations to the context of white-collar 
crimes. Logically, it would seem that in the case of white-collar 
offenses, general deterrence would be more effective because the 
offenses are always planned and offenders are better placed to 
undertake a cost–benefit analysis of their conduct.235 This 
understanding has led to calls for harsher penalties for white-collar 
232. Dale O. Cloninger and Roberto Marchesini suggested that capital 
punishment can deter crime. Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Execution 
and Deterrence: A Quasi-Controlled Group Experiment, 33 APPLIED ECON. 569 
(2001). However, contrary conclusions are reached in a number of other studies. 
See, e.g., John K. Cochran et al., Deterrence or Brutalization? An Impact 
Assessment of Oklahoma’s Return to Capital Punishment, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 107, 
129 (1994); Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: 
Déjà Vu All Over Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303, 328 (2005). For an 
overview of the numerous studies, see generally Jeffrey Fagan, Death and 
Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal Reasoning on Capital Punishment, 4 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255 (2006).
233. Michael Booth, No Credible Evidence on Whether Death Penalty 
Deters, Experts Say, DENVER POST (Apr. 29, 2016, 7:07 PM), http://www. 
denverpost.com/2013/06/02/no-credible-evidence-on-whether-death-penalty-deters-
experts-say/ [https://perma.cc/Q8UU-8T8L].
234. COMM. ON LAW & JUSTICE, DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL 102 (Daniel S. Nagin & John V. Pepper eds., 2012).
235. See Elizabeth Szockyj, Imprisoning White-Collar Criminals?, 23 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 485, 493-94 (1999); Henning, supra note 27.
1066 Michigan State Law Review 2016
offenses.236 For example, Anna Driggers asserts in relation to the 
Rajaratnam sentence that the penalty will:
[L]ikely be an effective deterrent. First, Rajaratnam’s sentence will send a 
message to a specific population of traders, those who consider or engage
in insider trading, as they see the zeal of prosecutors and their eagerness to 
use new investigative techniques. Second, the sentence upholds well-
known securities laws and demonstrates the government is serious about 
enforcing such laws. Third, the sentence is a term of lengthy incarceration 
in federal prison, which should be a greater deterrent than a short 
incarceration or probation-more common punishments in past insider 
trading cases.237
Yet, there is no evidence to show that even white-collar 
offenders are influenced by the heavy penalties imposed on others.238
Mary Kreiner Ramirez notes that in relation to economic crime, 
general deterrence is difficult to measure given that most people do 
not make their decision to avoid illegal conduct publicly known, and 
hence, empirical analysis of this issue is difficult to undertake.239
While there does not seem to be a link between higher penalties 
and less crime, it seems that people are not totally irrational when 
they contemplate committing crime. The evidence shows that to the 
extent that people make a cost–benefit decision about committing 
crimes, they generally only weigh up the risk of being caught, not 
what will happen when they are apprehended.240
236. See, e.g., John Esterhay, “Street Justice” for Corporate Fraud—
Mandatory Minimums for Major White-Collar Crime, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 135 
(2009); see also Driggers, supra note 1. Earlier suggestions of the likely existence of 
such a link have not been established (for example, it has been suggested that there 
is some basis to assume the validity of this assumption). See Julie Clarke & Mirko 
Bagaric, The Desirability of Criminal Penalties for Breaches of Part IV of the Trade 
Practices Act, 31 AUSTL. BUS. L. REV. 192 (2003); Donald Baker & Barbara Reeves, 
The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 619 (1977); Wouter Wils, Does 
the Effective Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC Require Not Only Fines on 
Undertakings but also Individual Penalties, in Particular Imprisonment? 3, Paper 
Presented at the EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop/Proceedings, EUR.
UNIV. INST. (2001).
237. Driggers, supra note 1, at 2036-37.
238. See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric et al., The Fallacy of General Deterrence and 
the Futility of Imprisoning Offenders for Tax Fraud, 26 AUSTL. TAX F. 511 (2011).
239. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime 
Reform After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 414-15 
(2003).
240. It is noted that this is contestable based on the social and fiscal 
psychology model, which provides that non-economic considerations are also taken 
into account when committing crimes. We thank the anonymous reviewer for this 
comment. 
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The National Research Council in its Report published in 2014
analyzed a large number of studies which examined the connection 
between harsh criminal sanctions (especially longer prison terms) 
and the crime rate and noted that the weight of evidence does not 
support the view that harsh penalties reduce crime. The Report 
states: 
Ludwig and Raphael (2003) find no deterrent effect of enhanced sentences 
for gun crimes; Lee and McCrary (2009) and Hjalmarsson (2009) find no 
evidence that the more severe penalties that attend moving from the 
juvenile to the adult justice system deter offending; and Helland and 
Tabarrok (2007) find only a small deterrent effect of the third strike of 
California’s three strikes law. As a consequence, the deterrent return to 
increasing already long sentences is modest at best. 
. . . .
The conclusion that increasing already long sentences has no material 
deterrent effect also has implications for mandatory minimum sentencing. 
Mandatory minimum sentence statutes have two distinct properties. One is 
that they typically increase already long sentences, which we have 
concluded is not an effective deterrent. Second, by mandating 
incarceration, they also increase the certainty of imprisonment given 
conviction. . . . Furthermore, as discussed at length by Nagin (2013a, 
2013b), all of the evidence on the deterrent effect of the certainty of 
punishment pertains to the deterrent effect of the certainty of 
apprehension, not to the certainty of postarrest outcomes (including 
certainty of imprisonment given conviction). Thus, there is no evidence 
one way or the other on the deterrent effect of the second distinguishing 
characteristic of mandatory minimum sentencing (Nagin, 2013a, 
2013b).241
The extract above, while doubting the link between harsher 
penalties and less crime, suggests that there is a connection between 
lower crime and the perception in people’s minds that if they commit 
an offense they will be apprehended and subjected to some form of a 
criminal sanction. This is consistent with the theory of absolute 
general deterrence and the orthodox understanding about the 
considerations that reduce crime. 
Accordingly, marginal general deterrence seems to be a flawed 
theory, while absolute general deterrence is a sound theory. The keys 
to reducing crime are (i) ensuring that criminal sanctions (which 
people would want to avoid) exist, and (ii) putting in place systems 
and investigative processes that will make prospective offenders 
believe that if they do offend there is a high chance that they will be 
241. THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12,
at 139-40.
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detected and prosecuted.242 The key to the first requirement is that the 
potential sanction does not need to be especially severe. A large fine 
or short prison term would suffice. 
B. No Evidence that Financial Crimes Negatively Impact the Market 
As we have seen, one of the main rationales for tough 
sentences on financial crime offenders is the damage to institutional 
integrity of the stock market and investor confidence. However, 
damage to institutional integrity is speculative. There is no evidence 
of a correlation between integrity of the market or investor 
confidence in the stock market and insider trading and market 
manipulation offending. If such a relationship did exist, presumably, 
the direct victims of such crimes would demonstrate the greatest loss 
of confidence in the stock market. In the United Kingdom, a scandal 
involving a pension-fund fraud committed by former Member of 
Parliament Robert Maxwell, which affected 25,000 individuals, led 
to a small study on the attitudinal effects of the crime on 25 of those 
individuals.243 Spalek concluded that:
The study reported in this paper illustrates that in some cases of fraud, 
victims may not be “duped investors”, but rather may distrust particular 
agents prior to any crime occurring, and may therefore be engaging in risk 
avoidance strategies. As a result, becoming the victim of a financial crime 
may not necessarily lead individuals to avoiding the financial system in 
general, because an integral part of their trust may be acknowledging that 
as investors they run risks.244
242. To this end, a number of other studies have also noted that there is a 
strong connection between tax evasion and a perceived low risk of detection. Many 
of these are summarized in James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 818 (1998); see also Robert Mason & Lyle D. Calvin, A Study of 
Admitted Income Tax Evasion, 13 LAW & SOC’Y 73, 77 (1978); Sue Yong, A
Critical Evaluation of the Economic Deterrence Model on Tax Compliance, 12 N.Z.
J. TAX’N L. & POL’Y 95 (2006). In particular, see the conclusions reached by Ken 
Devos, Measuring and Analysing Deterrence in Taxpayer Compliance Research, 10
J. AUSTL. TAX’N 182 (2007). Devos also notes that the complexity of taxation law 
may also be relevant to the level of compliance; although, its precise effect is not 
clear. Id. The same situation should apply to all white-collar offenses.
243. Basia Spalek, White-Collar Crime Victims and the Issue of Trust, Paper 
Presented at British Society of Criminology Conference, BRITISH SOC’Y OF 
CRIMINOLOGY (July 2000), http://www.britsoccrim.org/volume-4/ [https://perma.cc/ 
L7FS-PC53].
244. Id.
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The absence of a correlation between financial crimes and trust 
in the political and economic arenas is supported by research 
conducted elsewhere.245
To further test the proposition that there is a link between 
market confidence and market offenses, we now examine the 
behavior of the market following a high-profile sentence for a 
relevant crime. For each of the above thirty-six crimes, we look at 
the behavior of the share market on the day of the sentence for the
crime, the day after the for the sentence crime, and a week after the 
sentence for the crime. 
First, it is important to give some background for the 
methodology relating to the selection of cases and the relevant time 
periods. The above cases were chosen because they received the 
highest penalties for cases of their type in the respective 
jurisdictions. It is assumed that, given that these cases involved the 
highest penalties, they would have attracted a considerable degree of 
publicity and hence become known to much of the investor 
community. 
We focus only on cases since the year 2000, given that it was 
approximately around this time the Internet had become 
commonplace246 and there was ample capacity to widely and 
instantly impart information relating to events, including sentences 
for serious criminal offenses. In terms of modeling trends in the
fluctuation of the stock market, we consider three time periods. The 
first is the day of the case.247 The second is the business day after the 
sentence was imposed. The third reference point is a week after the 
sentence was imposed for the offense. We selected these time 
periods because the information about the sentence would be most 
prominent at the time of the sentence. Presumably the decisions, 
judgments, and behavior of investors and potential investors would 
be most considerably impacted when the details of the sentence and 
245. The general conclusion in these studies is that white-collar crimes have 
little, if any, effect on trust. See, e.g., John G. Peters & Susan Welch, The Effects of 
Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections, 74 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 697 (1980); Michael Mills & Elizabeth Moore, The Neglected Victims and 
Unexamined Costs of White-Collar Crime, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 408 (1990); Neal 
Shover et al., Long-Term Consequences of Victimization by White-Collar Crime, 11 
JUST. Q. 75 (1994).
246. Bruce Kogut, Introduction: The Internet Has Borders, in THE GLOBAL 
INTERNET ECONOMY 3 (Bruce Kogut ed., 2003).
247. Sentences are typically handed down early in the day, and hence, there 
is ample opportunity for news of the sentencing to impact trading on the stock 
market, which continues until 4:00 p.m. each business day. 
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the crime were most widely disseminated. The value of the 
respective stock markets was not analyzed more than a week after 
sentence because, presumably, by this time the impact of a sentence 
would have diluted considerably.
Most importantly, the cases we consider were not influenced by 
any pre-existing sentiment regarding stock market movements at 
around the time of the sentence. The analysis relating to stock market 
movement only commenced after the cases were identified. 
As we have seen, the concept of the “integrity of the market” is 
commonly used, but it has not been defined with any degree of 
detail. The term is commonly associated with the need to maintain 
investor confidence in the stock market, and hence, it presumably 
relates to maintaining conditions that give investors and prospective 
investors assuredness that the market is transparent and operates with 
a degree of probity. There is no direct test that can be developed to 
test the impact that market crime has on the sentiment of investors 
and prospective investors. As a proxy for this, we use the value of 
the stock market. If stock market crime did reduce confidence in the 
stock market, this would presumably result in investors and potential 
investors reducing their involvement in the market. The effect of this 
would reduce the total value of the stock market. In short, we assume 
that reduced confidence in the share market would result in a fall in 
the value of the price of securities listed on the stock market. 
In relation to the United States Stock Exchange, the main 
measure of the value of the share price is the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (“DJIA”), which shows how 30 significant U.S. listed 
companies, including General Electric and Walt Disney, traded 
during a standard trading session in the stock market.248 In Australia, 
there are two major stock market indices. The first is the All 
Ordinaries (XAO) or “All Ords,” which gives an indication of 
security trading for the Australian stock market and contains the 500 
largest ASX listed companies by way of market capitalization.249 The 
second is the S&P/ASX 200 (XJO) Index, which is the share market 
index for gauging security trading of the top 200 ASX listed 
companies by way of float-adjusted market capitalization.250 These 
248. Dow Jones Industrial Average – DJIA, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www. 
investopedia.com/terms/d/djia.asp [https://perma.cc/45LM-BQLY] (last visited Oct. 
24, 2016). 
249. All Ordinaries, MARKET INDEX, http://www.marketindex.com.au/all-
ordinaries [https://perma.cc/GHZ4-8PAP] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
250. S&P/ASX 200, MARKET INDEX, http://www.marketindex.com.au/asx200 
[https://perma.cc/FQY7-UKN7] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
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two track very closely in terms of value. Even though the ASX is 
now the major index adopted in Australia, we use the All Ordinaries 
because this was the official Index in 2000—when our case analysis 
commenced.
The methodology that we employ to test whether stock market 
crime impacts share price is admittedly crude. There are almost an 
infinite range of matters that drive investor behavior on the share 
market, including employment data, inflation figures, natural 
disasters, the balance of the terms of trade, and company 
performance data. In order to ascertain the impact of financial market 
crime on the confidence of investors, it would be necessary to hold 
all variables constant, with the only change being widespread 
reporting of a major stock market crime. This is impossible given 
that no two days are the same regarding the diversity of the 
economic and other data that emerges on any given day. 
Thus, the analysis below is subject to these considerable 
caveats. However, the analysis is important because the existing 
assumption is that financial market crime reduces investor 
confidence in the market. If this assumption is valid it needs to be 
demonstrated—otherwise financial market criminals are having their 
sentences increased simply on the basis of a judicial hunch. In order 
to give some legitimacy to this assumption, some evidence is 
necessary to show a connection between a reduction in investor 
confidence and financial market crime. The most telling and obvious 
demonstration of this connection would be to show that the share 
market goes into decline when reportage of major stock market 
crime occurs. Of course even such data would not be conclusive 
because it may well be that any such falls are due to other events, but 
nevertheless, some plausibility would be conferred to that theory. 
We now set out the data regarding movements in the share 
market price at the relevant time points for each of the cases set out 
above. 
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United States—Insider Trading Cases
Case Name 
and Date of 
Sentence
DJIA Start 
of Day of 
Sentence
DJIA End 
of Day of 
Sentence
DJIA 
Day after 
Sentence
DJIA 
Week 
after 
Sentence
1. U.S. v. 
Martoma, 48 
F. Supp. 3d 
555 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (Sept. 8, 
2014)
17,131.71 17,111.42 17,013.87 17,031.14
2. U.S. v. 
Kluger, 722 
F.3d 549 (3d 
Cir. 2013) 
(July 9, 2013)
15,228.46 15,300.34 15,291.66 15,451.85
3. U.S. v. 
Goffer, 721 
F.3d 113 (2d 
Cir. 2013) 
(July 1, 2013)
14,911.60 14,974.96 14,932.41 15,224.69
4. U.S. v. 
Bauer, 529 F. 
App’x 275 (3d 
Cir. 2013)
(June 27, 
2013)
14,921.28 15,024.49 14,909.60 15,135.84
5. U.S. v. 
Rajaratnam,
No. 09 Cr. 
1184(RJH), 
2012 WL 
362031
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
31, 2012)
(Jan. 31, 
2012)
12,654.78 12,632.91 12,716.46 12,878.20
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6. U.S. v. 
Contorinis,
692 F.3d 136 
(2d Cir. 2012)
(Aug. 17, 
2012)
11,499.02 11,491.91 11,478.13 11,555.03
7. U.S. v. 
Nacchio, 573 
F.3d 1062 
(10th Cir. 
2009) (July 
31, 2009)
9,154.61 9,171.61 9,286.56 9,370.07
8. U.S. v. 
Royer, 549 
F.3d 886 (2d 
Cir. 2008) 
(Dec. 17, 
2008)
8,921.91 8,824.34 8,604.99 8,468.48
9. U.S. v. 
Naseem, No. 
07-cr-00610-
RPP-1
(S.D.N.Y. 
June 4, 2008)
(Feb. 5, 2008)
12,631.85 12,265.13 12,200.10 12,552.24
10. U.S. v. 
Waksal, No. 
02-cr-01041-
WHP-1
(S.D.N.Y. 
June, 10, 
2003) (June 
10, 2003)
8,980.79 9,054.89 9,183.22 9,323.02
The above data is illuminating. It shows, more often than not, 
the share market does not fall in the immediate vicinity of a major 
insider trading offense. In six of ten cases, the share market in fact 
rose on the day of the sentence. If one compares the value of the 
share market on the day of the sentence to the close the day after, we 
see that that share market still rose in five of the cases. And a week 
after the sentence, the market had increased in seven out of ten 
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instances. Thus, of the thirty events, we see that overall the share 
market in fact rose on eighteen of these occasions. 
Australia—Insider Trading Cases
Case Name and 
Date of 
Sentence
All 
Ordinaries 
Start of 
Day of 
Sentence
All 
Ordinaries 
End of 
Day of 
Sentence
All 
Ordinaries 
Day after 
Sentence
All 
Ordinaries 
Week 
after 
Sentence
1. R v Xiao
[2016] NSWSC 
240 (Mar. 11, 
2016) 
5,210.90 5,224.80 5,242.40 5,239.30
2. Cth DPP v 
Christopher 
Russell Hill
[2015] VSC 86 
(Austl.) (Mar. 
17, 2015)
5,769.70 5,811.00 5,808.00 5,934.50
3. R v ZHU, Bo 
Shi [2013] 
NSWSC 127 
(Austl.) (Feb. 
15, 2013)
5,052.70 5,054.60 5,082.90 5,036.70
4. R v Hartman
[2010] NSWSC 
1422 (Austl.) 
(Dec. 2, 2010)
4,693.00 4,761.80 4,780.10 4,827.50
5. R v Mckay
[2007] NSWSC 
275 (Austl.) 
(Mar. 30, 2007)
5,952.60 5,978.80 5,908.20 6,063.40
6. R v Frawley
[2005] NSWSC 
585 (Austl.) 
(June 24, 2005)
4,218.00 4,203.80 4,191.20 4,224.10
7. R v Rivkin
[2003] NSWSC 
447 (Austl.) 
(May 29, 2003)
2,976.10 2,983.60 2,979.80 3,008.00
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8. R v Hannes
[2002] NSWSC 
1182 (Austl.) 
(Dec. 13, 2002)
2,955.70 2,941.20 2,921.90 2,978.80
The above data shows that more often than not, the share 
market does not fall in the immediate vicinity of a major insider 
trading offense. In five of the eight cases, the share market rose on 
the day of the sentence. If one compares the value of the share 
market on the day of the sentence to the close the day after, we see 
that that share market rose in four of eight cases, but a week after the 
day of the sentence this had increased to six out of eight cases. Thus, 
of the twenty-four events, we see that overall the share market in fact 
rose on fifteen of these occasions.
United States—Market Manipulation Cases
Case Name and 
Date of 
Sentence
DJIA 
Start of 
Day of 
Sentence
DJIA End 
of Day of 
Sentence
DJIA 
Day after 
Sentence
DJIA 
Week 
after 
Sentence
1. U.S. v. 
Hawatmeh
[Unreported, 
U.S. District 
Court in 
Tacoma] (June 
5, 2015)
17,905.38 17,849.46 17,766.55 17,898.84
2. U.S. v. 
Madoff, No. 09 
Cr. 213 (DC), 
2009 WL 
8681361 (June 
29, 2009)
8,440.13 8,529.38 8,447.00 8,324.87
3. U.S. v. 
Johnson
[Unreported, 
U.S. District 
Court, E.D. 
Va.] (Nov. 14, 
2008)
8,822.19 8,497.31 8,273.58 8,046.42
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4. U.S. v. 
Samuel Israel 
III, 331 F. 
App’x 864 (2d 
Cir. 2009) 
(June 24, 2008)
11,842.36 11,807.43 11,811.83 11,382.26
5. U.S. v. 
Scrushy
[Unreported, 
U.S. District 
Court, M.D. 
Ala.] (June 28, 
2007)
13,427.48 13,422.28 13,408.62 13,565.84
6. U.S. v. 
Skilling, No. H-
04-025-02,
2006 WL 
3030721 (S.D. 
Tex. Oct. 23, 
2006) (Oct. 23,
2006)
12,116.51 12,116.91 12,127.88 12,086.50
7. People v. 
Kozlowski, 846 
N.Y.S. 2d 44 
(N.Y. App. 
Div. 2007)
(Sept. 19, 
2005)
10,641.87 10,557.63 10,481.52 10,443.63
8. U.S. v. 
Ebbers, 458 
F.3d 110 (2d 
Cir. 2006 (July 
13, 2005)
10,513.36 10,557.39 10,628.89 10,689.15
9. U.S. v. 
Rigas, No. 02 
Cr. 1236 
(LBS), 2008 
WL 2544654 
(S.D.N.Y. June 
24, 2008) (June 
20, 2005)
10,621.54 10,609.11 10,599.67 10,290.78
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10. U.S. v. 
Aziz-Golshani
[Unreported, 
U.S. District 
Court, C.D. 
Cal.] (Jan. 22, 
2001)
10,581.90 10,578.24 10,649.81 10,702.19
The above data shows that in three of the ten instances, the 
share market rose on the day of the sentence and this increased to 
five instances if one compares the value of the share market on the 
morning of the sentence to the close the day after. This then fell back 
to three out of ten if one compares the value of stock market a week 
after the morning of the sentence. Thus, of the thirty events, we see 
that overall the share market in fact rose on eleven of these 
occasions.
Australia—Market Manipulation cases
Case Name 
and Date of 
Sentence
All 
Ordinaries 
Start of 
Day of 
Sentence
All 
Ordinaries 
End of 
Day of 
Sentence
All 
Ordinaries 
Day after 
Sentence
All 
Ordinaries 
Week 
after 
Sentence
1. Nigel 
Derek Heath 
v R [2016] 
NSWCCA 24 
(Austl.) (Feb. 
25, 2016)
4,943.30 4,944.70 4,945.10 5,083.50
2. R v 
Dulhunty; R v 
PR [2015] 
NSWSC 
1747 (Austl.) 
(Nov. 30, 
2015)
5,251.40 5,218.20 5,312.60 5,205.90
1078 Michigan State Law Review 2016
3. R v Nigel 
Derek Heath
[2015] 
NSWDC 282
(Austl.) 
(Sept. 25, 
2015)
5,102.30 5,076.70 5,145.10 5,089.20
4. R v
Jacobson
[2014] VSC 
592 (Austl.) 
(Nov. 28, 
2014)
5,381.40 5,298.10 5,190.70 5,345.40
5. R v 
Moylan
[2014] 
NSWSC 944 
(Austl.) (July 
25, 2014)
5,576.80 5,574.20 5,569.90 5,547.60
6. R v Chan
[2010] VSC 
312 (Austl.) 
(July 13, 
2010)
4,423.60 4,400.00 4,477.30 4,418.70
7. R v Austin
[2001] 
NSWSC 484 
(Austl.) (June 
13, 2001)
3,335.10 3,324.50 3,346.20 3,348.40
The above data shows that in two of the seven instances, the 
share market rose on the day of the sentence but this increased to five 
out of seven if one compares the value of the share market on the 
opening of the day of the sentence to the close the day after. This 
then fell back to two out seven if one compares the value of stock 
market a week after the morning of the sentence. Thus, of the 
twenty-one events, we see that overall the share market rose on nine 
of these occasions.
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If one adds all the 105 events,251 we see that the market rose on 
fifty-six of these occasions, or on 53% of the occasions. On any 
given day, the market can obviously increase, decrease, or remain the 
same. During the period 2000 to 2015, both the Dow Jones and All 
Ordinaries increased.252 Thus, one would expect that there would be 
more days and weeks where the respective indices increased as 
opposed to decreased. There is no readily accessible data on this 
apart from a chart that notes the number of days that the Dow Jones 
increased as opposed to decreased during the period 2000 to 2015. 
This shows that from 2000 to 2015, the Dow Jones increased on 53% 
of trading days.253 Interestingly, this is identical to the percentage of 
days and weeks described above in which the stock market indices 
rose around the time of sentencing for major stock market offending. 
Thus, on the basis of the above data, the most tenable conclusion is 
that stock market offenses have no impact on the integrity of the 
markets or the level of confidence that investors have in the market. 
As noted above, this data is not definitive of the impact that 
such crime has on the market. However, it is supportive of the 
conclusion that there is no negative link between stock market crime 
and investor confidence. It is even more supportive of the conclusion 
that there is not a strong link between these two events. If the link 
regarding these two events was strong, presumably it could operate 
to negate at least some otherwise positive sentiment stemming from 
other favorable economic news that may have emerged on a relevant 
trading day. The most important observation to emerge from the 
above analysis is that an examination of stock market movements in 
the period shortly after sentences have been handed down in major 
stock market crime provides no support for the theory that major 
financial crime undermines the integrity of the market or investor 
confidence. It follows that unless positive evidence is shown to the 
contrary, this consideration cannot any longer be used to justify 
harsher terms for criminals who commit stock market offenses.254
251. There are thirty-five cases above and share market movements for each 
case are tracked for three relevant days. 
252. On January 1, 2000 the Dow Jones was 11,357.51 and this rose to 
17,425.03 on December 31, 2015. During the same period, all the Ordinaries 
increased from 3,124.10 to 5,344.60. 
253. Financial Market and Economic Research, CRESTMONT RESEARCH,
www.CrestmontResearch.com/docs/Stock-Yo-Yo.pdf [https://perma.cc/78XN-9TFL]
(last visited Nov. 14, 2016). 
254. This follows from the view that aggravating factors must be established 
beyond reasonable doubt. Anderson v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 520, 536; R v 
Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270 (Austl.). 
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It is important to emphasize that the sample size of cases above 
is relatively small and, given the multitude of other factors that 
influence stock market moves, the conclusions we have reached 
about the impact of market offenses on the stock market are 
necessarily tentative. However, what is certain is that there are a 
large number of variables that impact share market price and that 
individuals have a strong desire to increase their wealth and to derive 
passive income, such as in the form of stocks. The value of the total 
shares listed on the Dow Jones and All Ordinaries is many trillions 
of dollars. Moreover, there is a massive financial services industry 
that has been established with the singular goal of investing in the 
share market with a view to increasing financial wealth. In order to 
do this, stock brokers and traders and the broader securities and 
financial industry are highly motivated to develop tools and 
algorithms that anticipate the likely movement of the market. 
There are a large number of such tools in existence.255
Crucially, no market predictive model incorporates market crime into 
the variables it uses regarding the likely movements in the market. 
This is because market experts are aware that stock market offenses 
have no impact on investor confidence. Alternatively, all of the 
experts are wrong and the courts are correct that market offenses 
undermine investor confidence. The markets are driven by empirical 
data. The courts are not, and thus, the first hypothesis is preferable. 
An obvious counter to this analysis is that stock market 
offending is relevant to investor confidence and that the sentencing 
of offenders for these offenses in fact increases or at least maintains 
confidence because it shows that such crimes are detected and dealt 
with sternly. Thus, the contention is that news of stock market 
offending in fact firms up investor confidence as opposed to 
diminishes it precisely because the sentences that are imposed are 
typically stern. To fully test this proposition, we would need to 
compare stock market movements in cases where offenders were 
dealt with by way of very lenient sentences (and preferably by means 
of a tokenistic sentence) to when the same offenders were given the 
same sentences as above in circumstances where all other factors that 
could influence the market were held constant. This is obviously 
255. Moving Average Convergence/Divergence Oscillator (MACD),
TRADING VIEW, https://new.tradingview.com/chart/macd/ [https://perma.cc/947L-
TD3Z] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016); ND Research - Volatility Momentum End,
MARKET ANALYST, http://www.mav7.com/volatility-momentum-end/ [https://perma. 
cc/585R-WRFK] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
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impossible. However, in our view the counter is not persuasive for 
several reasons. First, as we have seen above, the imposition of harsh 
sentences on market manipulators does not seem to increase or 
decrease market confidence. It appears to have no impact whatsoever 
on the price of stocks. Secondly, if news of market crime is to have a 
meaningful impact on investor confidence, the greatest indicator of 
criminal activity in this area is a finding of guilt (which is a 
precondition to the imposition of a sentence) for a market 
manipulation offense; hence, this event is likely to adversely impact, 
as opposed to having a positive impact, irrespective of what penalty 
is imposed. The fact that harsh penalties are imposed on offenders 
does not seem to negate the negative impact that can flow from the 
incidence of crime.256 The most likely scenario is that investors and 
potential investors in stocks are aware that all investing has a level of 
risk, including the risk of inappropriate trading, and factor this into 
their investment decisions. The best manner to preserve confidence 
in the market is to implement systems such that investors and 
potential investors believe that people who attempt to cheat the 
market are detected and prosecuted—the sternness of the ultimate 
penalty is largely irrelevant. 
Given that general deterrence is a flawed sentencing objective 
and that financial market offenses do not undermine the market, the 
main considerations in favor of harsh penalties for this cohort of 
white-collar offenders are flawed. It follows that a different, more 
lenient approach should be taken towards sentencing market 
manipulators and insider trading offenders. In developing this 
approach, the key determinant regarding the severity of an 
appropriate sanction is the principle of proportionality. It is to this 
that we now turn. 
256. See, e.g., Alyssa Davis, In U.S., Concern About Crime Climbs to 15-
Year High, GALLUP (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/190475/americans-
concern-crime-climbs-year-high.aspx [https://perma.cc/272N-CMDD]. This report 
shows that fear of serious crime is increasing perhaps due to increased media report 
of crime and a slight increase in the rate of crime. The fact that harsh penalties are 
imposed on culprits of serious crime does not seem to negate this fear. 
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IV. PROPORTIONALITY—THE KEY DETERMINANT
A. Financial Crime Is Less Damaging than Sexual and Violent 
Crimes
In its simplest and most persuasive form, the proportionality 
principle is the view that the punishment should fit the crime.257 The 
principle of proportionality (at least in theory) operates to “restrain 
excessive, arbitrary and capricious punishment”258 by requiring that 
punishment must not exceed the gravity of the offense, even in order 
to extend a period of imprisonment in order to further protect the 
community from the offender..259
As the High Court of Australia stated in Hoare v The Queen,260
“a basic principle of sentencing law is that a sentence of 
imprisonment imposed by a court should never exceed that which 
can be justified as appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the 
crime considered in the light of its objective circumstances.”261
Proportionality is a requirement of the sentencing regimes of ten 
states in the United States.262 The precise considerations, which 
inform the proportionality principle, vary in those jurisdictions, but 
generally there are six relevant criteria:
(1) Whether the penalty shocks a reasonable sense of decency;
(2) The gravity of the crime;
(3) The prior criminal history of the offender;
(4) The legislative objective relating to the sanction;
(5) A comparison of the sanction imposed on the accused with the penalty 
that would be imposed in other jurisdictions; and
257. The contours of the proportionality principle are discussed at greater 
length in Mirko Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage That Is Proportionality 
in Sentencing, 25 N.Z. U. L. REV. 411, 414-15 (2013). The below discussion 
regarding proportionality is derived from Bagaric, From Arbitrariness to Coherency 
in Sentencing, supra note 29, 394-401.
258. Richard G. Fox, The Meaning of Proportionality in Sentencing, 19 
MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 489, 492 (1994).
259. Veen v. R (No. 2) [1988] HCA 14, ¶ 8 (Mason, C.J., Brennan, Dawson, 
& Toohey, JJ.).
260. Hoare v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 348, 354 (Austl.).
261. Id. at 354.
262. This is discussed in Gregory S. Schneider, Sentencing Proportionality 
in the States, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 241 (2012). The article focused on the operation of 
the principle in Illinois, Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia.
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(6) A comparison of the sanction with other penalties for similar and 
related offenses in the same jurisdiction.263
In addition to this, a survey of state sentencing law by Thomas 
Sullivan and Richard Frase shows that at least nine states have 
constitutional provisions relating to prohibiting “excessive penalties 
or treatment,”264 and twenty-two states have constitutional clauses 
that “prohibit cruel and unusual penalties, including eight states with 
a proportionate-penalty clause.”265
Broken down to its core features, proportionality has two 
limbs. The first is the seriousness of the crime and the second is the 
harshness of the sanction. Further, the principle has a quantitative 
component—the two limbs must be matched. For the principle to be 
satisfied, the seriousness of the crime must be equal to the harshness 
of the penalty.266
Some commentators have argued that proportionality is so 
vague as to be meaningless, in light of the fact that there is no stable 
and clear manner in which the punishment can be matched to the 
crime. Jesper Ryberg notes that one of the key and damaging 
criticisms of proportionality is that it “presupposes something which 
is not there, namely, some objective measure of appropriateness 
between crime and punishment.”267 The most obscure and 
unsatisfactory aspect of proportionality is that there is no stable and 
clear manner in which the punishment can be matched to the crime. 
Jesper Ryberg further notes that to give content to the theory, it is 
necessary to rank crimes, rank punishments, and anchor the scales.268
There is some merit in Ryberg’s critique. While doctrinally it 
has been argued that there is a manner in which firmer content could 
be accorded to the proportionality doctrine,269 an exact matching of 
263. Id. at 250.
264. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY 
PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
154-55 (2009).
265. Id. at 154.
266. Fox, supra note 258, at 491. 
267. JESPER RYBERG, THE ETHICS OF PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT 184 
(2004).
268. Id. at 185. Even retributivists have been unable to invoke the 
proportionality principle in a manner that provides firm guidance regarding 
appropriate sentencing ranges. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW 
ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING 122 (2005).
269. Mirko Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage that is Proportionality 
in Sentencing, supra note 257, at 440.
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offense severity and penalty harshness is not feasible in light of the 
current understanding of proportionalism.
However, this is not an issue that needs to be settled and 
resolved for current purposes. Irrespective of the precise manner in 
which harmfulness is assessed, it is clear that a cardinal criterion is 
the extent to which it sets back the interests and welfare of victims.270
Accordingly, homicide offenses are the most serious crimes. This is 
followed by other crimes against the person. Studies show victims of 
violent crime and sexual crime have their well-being more 
significantly set back than for other types of crime.271 For example, a 
review of the existing literature regarding the effects of violent and 
sexual crimes on key quality of life indices by Rochelle Hanson, 
Genelle Sawyer, Angela Begle, and Grace Hubel272 demonstrated 
that many victims suffered considerably across a range of well-being 
indicia, well after the physical signs had passed.273 The report 
concluded: 
In sum, findings from the well-established literature on general trauma and 
the emerging research on crime victimization indicate significant 
functional impact on the quality of life for victims. However, more 
research is necessary to understand the mechanisms of these relationships 
and differences among types of crime victimization, gender, and 
racial/ethnic groups.274
In another study examining the effects of either violent or 
property crime on the health of 2,430 respondents,275 Chester L. Britt 
noted, “[V]ictims of violent crime reported lower levels of perceived 
health and physical well being, controlling for measures of injury 
and for sociodemographic characteristics.”276 Further, these findings 
were not confined to violent crime: Victims of property crime also 
reported reduced levels of perceived well-being, but it was less 
profound than in the case of violent crime.277
270. Id. at 413.
271. Chester L. Britt, Health Consequences of Criminal Victimization,
8 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 63, 69-70 (2001). 
272. Rochelle Hanson et al., The Impact of Crime Victimization on Quality of 
Life, 23 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 189, 189 (2010).
273. Id. at 194.
274. Id. at 194-95.
275. Britt, supra note 271, at 63.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 69-70; see also Adriaan J.M. Denkers & Frans Willem Winkel, 
Crime Victims’ Well-Being and Fear in a Prospective and Longitudinal Study,
5 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 141, 155-56 (1998).
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Property offenses set back the interests of victims, but they 
recover quicker than victims of sexual and violent offenses. To the 
extent that property offenses damage victims, relevant considerations 
include the value of the crime and financial means of the victim. 
Thus, crimes committed against individuals, especially those who are 
financially vulnerable or fragile (i.e., the poor and unemployed) 
cause more direct and much greater harm than crimes278 committed 
against the wealthy individuals or large corporations. Another 
important consideration is the nature of the victim. Individual people 
have actual interests, projects, and feelings. Institutions do not. They 
are inanimate. They have no feelings, preferences, or desires. The 
only hurt that is felt by them is completely derivative upon harm 
caused to individuals involved in the markets. Thus, crimes that 
damage confidence in the market are potentially harmful. However, 
as we have seen, this does not seem to be the case in relation to 
white-collar crimes in the form of insider trading and market 
manipulation offenses. 
Thus, relatively speaking, property offenses are at the lower 
end of the harm spectrum so far as proportionality is concerned, and 
within the category of property offenses, crimes against financial 
market offenses are the least serious.279 Imprisoning these offenders 
violates a fundamental tenet stemming from the proportionality 
principle, which is that the most serious forms of sanctions should be 
reserved for the most damaging forms of crime. 
B. Illustration of Appropriate Penalties for Market Cheats 
Market cheats often benefit considerably from their crimes. 
This seems to generate an impulse to punish them severely. 
However, as we have seen, beyond this unreflective instinct there is 
no rational basis for imprisoning offenders who commit insider 
trading and market manipulation offenses for long periods. Long 
prison terms do not deter the commission of similar offenses. They 
do not undermine the integrity of markets. Financial market offenses 
are low on the scale of harm-occasioning crimes. They do not 
mandate the imposition of the harshest criminal sanctions, especially 
for long durations. Moreover, long prison terms for market cheats are 
self-defeating from the community perspective because they result in 
278. This is often already reflected in existing practice. See Driggers, supra 
note 1, at 2037.
279. See, e.g., Britt, supra note 271.
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the community inflicting considerable suffering on itself by directing 
precious resources to prisons and hence redirecting the resources 
from incontestable community benefit in the form of education and 
health. 
As a society, we need to become clever and more effective 
regarding community expenditure. There is nothing positive that can 
be achieved by a ten-year term of imprisonment for an insider trader 
or market manipulator that cannot be achieved by a less harsh 
sanction. A progressive, empirically informed, and morally sound 
sentencing approach to insider trading and market manipulation 
offenses entails that the maximum penalty for such offenses would 
be one year imprisonment, and a typical penalty in the order of six 
months, which in most instances could be substituted with another 
sanction—in particular, electronic monitoring.280
Further, in most circumstances, a short prison term should be 
substituted for a period of electronic monitoring of approximately 
double the length of the prison term. There are other ways to limit 
the liberty of offenders beyond confining them behind high walls. 
Financial market cheats do not scare society and have not shown an 
inclination to engage in violent conduct, and hence, there is no 
demonstrated need to contain them behind concrete walls to protect 
the community from acts that can seriously harm individuals. The 
advantage of electronic monitoring is that it can confine offenders at 
a fraction of the cost of imprisonment.281
Electronic monitoring, which originated in the United States in 
the early 1980s, is now used in a number of countries, including the 
United Kingdom.282 There are now over 100,000 people under 
electronic monitoring in the United States.283
280. See generally Mike Nellis, Surveillance and Confinement: Explaining 
and Understanding the Experience of Electronically Monitored Curfews, 1 EUR. J.
PROB. 41, 41 (2009).
281. Natasha Alladina, The Use of Electronic Monitoring in the Alaska 
Criminal Justice System: A Practical Yet Incomplete Alternative to Incarceration,
28 ALASKA L. REV. 125, 144 (2011). 
282. See Nellis, supra note 280, at 41.
283. Mike Nellis, Electronic Monitoring: Exploring the Commercial 
Dimension, 58 CRIM. JUST. MATTERS 12, 12 (2008); Matthew DeMichele & Brian 
Payne, Offender Supervision with Electronic Technology: Community Corrections 
Resource, BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE 132 (2009), https://www.appa-net.org/eweb/ 
docs/APPA/pubs/OSET_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/SP4F-QYCM]. For a summary of 
its introduction and use in the United States, see Lars H. Andersen & Signe H. 
Andersen, Effect of Electronic Monitoring on Social Welfare Dependence,
13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 349, 351 (2014); see also Brian K. Payne, It’s a 
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Electronic monitoring works by attaching a transmitting object 
on the person of the offender that is designed to communicate signals 
to authorities. Electronic monitoring can be via radio devices or 
GPS. In relation to GPS, the subject is monitored 24/7 by satellites 
receiving transmitted information that is then triangulated to provide 
data on location and movement.284 When the subject enters a 
forbidden territory or leaves a geographic limit, the surveillance 
officers are alerted via an alarm, which is also sent to the offender. If 
the offender does not take corrective action, the authorities can order 
intervention in order to bring him into conformity. 
The main advantage of electronic monitoring is that the process 
costs far less than imprisonment.285 The potential for cost savings 
ranges from six to ten times when compared to the alternatives. 
Another considerable advantage of electronic monitoring is that 
studies indicate that active electronic monitoring reduces 
recidivism.286 For example, a study of recidivism rates of Argentinian 
offenders comparing those who had been jailed versus those who had 
been tagged showed that the former’s recidivism rate was 22% 
compared to 13% for the latter.287
Small World, but I Wouldn’t Want to Paint it: Learning from Denmark’s Experience 
with Electronic Monitoring, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 381, 382 (2014); 
Matthew DeMichele, Electronic Monitoring: It Is a Tool, Not a Silver Bullet, 13 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 393 (2014).
284. See Payne, supra note 283, at 382. 
285. A review in 2006 of the electronic monitoring of offenders found that the 
cost is about one-fifth that of imprisonment and “robust” in detecting violations of the 
term of the order. See NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, THE ELECTRONIC MONITORING OF ADULT 
OFFENDERS 1 (2006), www.nao.org.uk/publications/0506/the_electronic_ monitoring_ 
of_a.aspx [https://perma.cc/4PZJ-SKGF]; see also Alladina, supra note 281, at 144.
286. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC MONITORING REDUCES RECIDIVISM
2 (Sept. 2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/234460.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
U6U5-UBYN]; see also Fredrik Marklund & Stina Holmberg, Effects of Early 
Release from Prison Using Electronic Tagging in Sweden, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 41 (2009).
287. Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, Criminal Recidivism After 
Prison and Electronic Monitoring, 121 J. POL. ECON. 28, 54 (2013); see also
William Bales et al., A Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment of Electronic 
Monitoring, Report Submitted to the Office of Justice Program (2010), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/230530.pdf [https://perma.cc/55TB-6Y8D];
Stephen Gies et al., Monitoring High-Risk Sex Offenders with GPS Technology: An 
Evaluation of the California Supervision Program, Final Report (2012), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238481.pdf [https://perma.cc/PF4P-SRLL];
John K. Roman et al., The Costs and Benefits of Electronic Monitoring for 
Washington, D.C., D.C. CRIME POL’Y INST. 3 (Sept. 2012).
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Despite this, there has been a decline in the use of electronic 
monitoring in the United States. As noted by Lars H. Andersen and 
Signe H. Andersen, there are three main reasons for this:
First, the money saved on imprisonment thanks to the use of electronic 
monitoring was now spent on testing and supervising the electronically 
monitored people (e.g., alcohol tests). Second, electronic monitoring and 
other noncustodial alternatives to imprisonment tended to widen the 
punitive system by putting more people under the purview of the criminal 
justice system. Third, the more intensive testing and supervision increased 
detection rates for recidivism and technical violations, which in turn sent 
even more people into custody. This led some policy makers to view 
electronic monitoring and other noncustodial alternatives to imprisonment 
as failed social experiments, and the popularity of these programs faded in 
the United States.288
None of these potential issues apply to financial markets so 
long as they are only subject to electronic monitoring in 
circumstances where they would have otherwise been sentenced to a 
term of prison—thus there is no prospect of making offenders from 
this cohort subject to the purview of the prison system.
The main emphasis of this Article has been on market 
offenders. However, the conclusions have several notable 
implications for white-collar offenses more generally. The main 
rationale for punishing white-collar offenders heavily is general 
deterrence, which, as we have seen, is flawed. Once this driver is 
removed from the white-collar sentencing calculus, the case for 
harsh treatment is significantly weakened. It is less weakened in 
situations where the victim is an identifiable individual, yet, as we 
have seen, financial loss to a victim is far less damaging than a 
violation of their physical or sexual integrity. It follows that even 
white-collar offenses committed against individuals should be treated 
considerably more leniently. As a general rule, offenders guilty of 
white-collar offenses which cause harm to individuals should not be 
sentenced to terms of imprisonment beyond two years.
CONCLUSION
Insider trading and market manipulation offenses can generate 
considerable gains to offenders. Understandably, there is a strong 
desire to punish these offenders. However, the punitive impulse must 
be moderated and informed by the attainable objectives of sentencing 
288. Andersen & Andersen, supra note 283, at 351.
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and normative constraints regarding the appropriate amount of 
punishment. 
Insider trading and market manipulation offenses frequently 
result in offenders being sentenced to imprisonment—often for 
years, and in some instances, decades. The penalties for such 
offenses are increasing. This approach is empirically and 
normatively unsound. 
The main sentencing rationale that is invoked for imposing 
stern sanctions on these market cheats is the need to supposedly deter 
other offenders from committing similar crimes. From the common-
sense perspective, this aim is feasible, and in fact sensible. But it is 
contradicted by the empirical studies. There is no evidence that 
prospective white-collar offenders are discouraged from committing 
the crime by the prospect of harsh penalties if they are detected and 
successfully prosecuted. Accordingly, the objective of general 
deterrence cannot justify severe penalties for such offenders. 
Orthodox sentencing methodology suggests that another key 
reason for imposing harsh sentences on insider traders and market 
manipulators is that their crimes damage confidence in the markets 
and the integrity of the market system. This claim is always made 
without proof. In this Article, the claim was tested. Our comparison 
of stock market moves shortly after sentences for major stock market 
crime provides no support for this claim. In fact, our study is 
suggestive of the contrary hypothesis. In the period shortly after a 
sentence is handed down for a major stock market offense, the value 
of the market more commonly goes up rather than down. 
Moreover, crimes committed by insider traders and market 
manipulators do not normally harm people in a meaningful fashion. 
Insider trading and market manipulation offenses can result in an 
unfair gain to the offender, but this does not necessarily translate to a 
loss to another individual. And if such a loss was perceptible, the 
evidence suggests that victims of financial crime recover from such 
offenses far more readily than sexual and violent crime victims. 
Financial crime is bad, but not as a damaging as sexual and violent 
offenses. The default position is that the most severe forms of 
punishment should be reserved for the most severe crimes. This 
approach repudiates current sentencing patterns for insider trading 
and market manipulation offenders. 
There is not a single community benefit that will be secured by 
sending insider traders and market manipulators to lengthy terms of 
imprisonment. The maximum prison term for such offenders should 
be no more than imprisonment for one year, and in most cases this 
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should be substituted for a period of electronic monitoring of two 
years. White-collar offenders who harm target individuals should be 
dealt with more severely. Yet, the harm they cause is not as
significant as that approaching the most serious form of criminal 
offending in the form of serious sexual and violent crime, and hence 
the maximum terms for even these offenders should be greatly 
reduced—to no more than two years’ imprisonment. 
The recommendations proposed in this Article would provide 
proportionate sentences for white-collar criminals, and would result 
in a reduction in incarceration levels, saving the community large 
amounts of taxpayer dollars. In turn, the amount saved could be 
directed into positive government programs such as education and 
health. Most of all, there would not be any offsetting disadvantages. 
The benefits would still be greater if an empirically based approach 
to sentencing was applied to all offense categories.
